SPHERES OF AUTONOMY: REFORMING THE CONTENT
NEUTRALITY DOCTRINE IN FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Steven J. Heyman*
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence almost exclusively prohibits laws
restricting freedom of speech based on the content of the speech. In this Article,
Professor Steven Heyman takes exception to the content neutrality doctrine,
arguing that its strict application both minimizes other interests competing with
speech and fails to elevate the premises on which the First Amendment stands.
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INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago, during the waning days of the Term, the Supreme Court
issued an opinion in a routine free speech case. For some months, a postal worker
named Earl Mosley had conducted a lonely vigil on the sidewalk outside a Chicago
public school, protesting what he regarded as racial discrimination. After the
Chicago City Council imposed a ban on picketing outside schools, Mosley
challenged the ordinance in federal court, asserting that peaceful, non-disruptive
picketing was entitled to protection under the First Amendment.1 In Police
Department v. Mosley,2 the Supreme Court agreed that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, but rested its decision on more limited grounds. The Chicago
ordinance, Justice Marshall observed, did not prohibit all demonstrations near
schools, but instead made an exception for “‘the peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute.’”3 Because the city was unable to advance a persuasive
reason for distinguishing between labor and non-labor picketing, Marshall
concluded that the ordinance denied protesters like Mosley the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.4
While at first glance Mosley was decided on narrow grounds, this appearance
was deceptive, for Justice Marshall took the opportunity to articulate a broad vision
of the First Amendment. “The central problem with Chicago’s ordinance,” he
declared,
is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.
. . . But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content. . . . To permit the continued building of
our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought,
free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden
censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity
because of its content would completely undercut the “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”5

1

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled for Mosley on this ground. Mosley
v. Police Dep’t, 432 F.2d 125 6, 1259 (7th Cir. 1970 ).
2
408 U .S. 92 (1972).
3
Id. at 93 (quoting Municipal Code, ch. 193-1(i)).
4
Id. at 99-102.
5
Id. at 95-96 (q uoting New York T imes C o. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (196 4))
(citations omitted).
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Although the case attracted little notice at the time,6 Mosley’s doctrine of
content neutrality has become the cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.7 The doctrine has two facets: the government may not
restrict speech because of its content (the rule against content regulation), nor may
it use content as a basis for treating some speech more favorably than other speech
(the rule against content discrimination). Governmental action that contravenes
these principles is said to be “‘presumptively invalid’” under the First Amendment.8
In addition, the Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that expression may be
restricted “to shield the sensibilities of listeners,”9 or because it “may have an
adverse emotional impact on the audience.”10 These doctrines lie at the heart of
many important recent decisions, including: American Booksellers Association v.
Hudnut,11 which struck down the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinance;
Simon & Schuster v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board,12 which
overturned New York’s Son-of-Sam law; Texas v. Johnson13 and United States v.
Eichman,14 which held flag-burning protected under the First Amendment; Collin
v. Smith,15 which upheld the rights of Nazis to march in Skokie; and R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul,16 which overturned a ban on cross-burning and other forms of hate
speech.
As these cases make clear, the content neutrality doctrine remains deeply
controversial both on and off the Court.17 The problem stems from the fact that
6

See Kenneth L . Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
C H I. L. R EV . 20, 28 & n.43 (1975).
7
See, e.g., Erwin Che merinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme C ourt’s Application, 74 S. C AL. L. R EV . 49, 50 (2000)
(observing that content neutrality “has b ecome the core of free sp eech analysis”).
8
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U .S. 803, 817 (200 0) (quoting R.A.V .
v. City of S t. Paul, 5 05 U .S. 37 7, 38 2 (1992 )).
9
Id. at 813.
10
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (198 8).
11
771 F.2d 323 (7th C ir. 198 5), aff’d mem ., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986 ).
12
502 U .S. 105 (1991 ).
13
491 U .S. 397 (1989 ).
14
496 U .S. 310 (1990 ).
15
578 F.2d 119 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
16
505 U .S. 377 (1992 ).
17
For commentary that generally supports the doctrine, see L AURENCE H. T RIBE ,
A MERICAN C ON STITU TION AL L A W ch. 12 (2d ed. 19 88); Chem erinsky, supra note 7 ; Karst,
supra note 6; Geo ffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 W M . &
M ARY L. R EV . 189 (1983); Geoffrey R. Stone , Restrictions on S peech B ecause o f Its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. C H I. L. R EV . 81 (197 8);
Susan H. W illiams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. P A . L. R EV .
615 (1991). The strongest critic of the doctrine on the Supreme Co urt has been Justice
Stevens. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. C ity of St. Pa ul, 505 U.S. 377 , 420 -22 (1 992 ) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 -47 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young
v. Am. M ini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-71 (1976) (plurality opinion). For other
criticisms of the doctrine from a variety of perspectives, see ST E VE N H. S H IFF RIN , T HE F IRST
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some speech causes harm precisely because of its content: threats may instill fear,
incitement provoke violence, false advertising defraud consumers, and so on. This
poses a dilemma for First Amendment jurisprudence. According to Mosley, speech
may “never” be regulated because of its content, for that is “[t]he essence of . . .
censorship.”18 If this view were taken literally, however, it would disable
government from regulating speech even when necessary to prevent serious injury
to individuals or society. In response to this concern, the Court has carved out two
exceptions to the neutrality doctrine. First, the justices have adhered to the
traditional view that some categories of speech are entitled to little or no protection
under the First Amendment.19 Second, the Court has held in principle — though
very rarely in practice — that even fully protected speech may be regulated based
on content where necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.20
A M E N D M E N T, D EMOCRACY , A N D R OMAN CE ch. 1 (1990) [hereinafter SH IFF RIN , R OMANCE ];
Daniel A. Farber, Conten t Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68
G EO . L.J. 727 (1980 ); Martin H . Red ish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 S TAN . L. R EV . 113 (1981); T.M . Scanlon, Jr., Content Regulation Reconsidered,
in D E M O C R AC Y A N D TH E M ASS M EDIA 331 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990); Paul B. Stephan
III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 V A . L. R EV . 203 (1982).
18
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U .S. 92, 96, 99 (1972 ).
19
For the traditional view, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(stating that such catego ries of sp eech as ob scenity, defama tion, and fighting words are
outside the protection o f the First Amendment). As the Court has observed, in recent decades
the scope of these traditional categories has been narrowed, but “a limited categorical
approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.” R.A.V.,
505 U.S. at 383.
20
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2 000);
Simon & Schuster v. M emb ers of N .Y. State Crime V ictims B d., 502 U .S. 105, 118 (199 1).
For a rare decision sustaining a content-based regulation under this standard, see Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that ban on electioneering within
one hundred feet of polling place was necessary to advance compelling state interests in
preventing voter intimidation and election fraud).
By contrast, content-neutral regulations are reviewed under a less demanding standard.
The Co urt has held that the government:
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place , or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content
of the regu lated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
com munication o f the inform ation.”
W ard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Similarly, under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the government
may regulate symbolic conduct (such as draft card burning) if the regulation:
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
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Unfortunately, however, the Court has never succeeded in explaining the rationale
for these exceptions, or in squaring them with the general principle of content
neutrality. 21 If the First Amendment allows harm-based regulation in some cases,
why not in others? Yet if speech may be restricted whenever it causes social harm,
the First Amendment would seem to afford little protection.
Thus, the Court’s free speech jurisprudence has been marked by a deep and
unresolved conflict between a strong commitment to content neutrality and an
uneasy recognition of the limits of that commitment. This tension is clearly
reflected in the justices’ rhetoric, in which sweeping statements of the content
neutrality principle often appear side-by-side with ad hoc exceptions and
qualifications.22 In many cases, there appears to be no principled way for judges to
choose between following the general rule and recognizing an exception. For this
reason, the Court’s First Amendment opinions often seem arbitrary and
unpersuasive. Far from illuminating the problem, the doctrine of content neutrality,
when taken as the central concern of the First Amendment, only makes it more
obscure.
In my view, the time has come to reconsider the content neutrality doctrine.
This Essay is offered as a step in that direction. Content neutrality, I shall argue,
is an important element of free speech jurisprudence, but it should not be regarded
as “the first principle of the First Amendment.”23 Instead, it should be understood
substantial governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendm ent freedom s is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. at 377. The C ourt has indicated that these two tests for content-neutral regulations
are substantially similar, see Clark, 468 U.S. at 298, and that they amount to an
intermediate standa rd of review, see Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189
(1997).
21
See infra Part II.A.
22
For example, writing for the Co urt in Simon & Schuster, Justice O’Connor declared
in no uncertain terms that “‘[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on
the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment,’” 502
U.S. at 116 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)), only to state two
pages later that such regulations would be up held if they me t the requirements of strict
scrutiny. Id. at 118. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the strict scrutiny
exception, and insisted that “the sole question is, or ought to be, whether the restriction is in
fact content base d.” Id. at 125 (Kenned y, J., concurring in judgment). Such restrictions, he
asserted, “amount[] to raw censorship . . . forbidden by the text of the First Amendment and
well-settled principles protecting speech and press.” Id. at 128 (citation omitted). At the
same time, however, he acknowledged that there were certain “historic and traditional
categories,” such as obscenity, defamation, and incitement, in which content-based regulation
was permissible. Id. at 127.
23
Hill v. Colorad o, 53 0 U .S. 70 3, 789 (2000) (K ennedy, J., dissenting) (accusing the
majo rity of disregarding “the neutrality that must be the first principle of the First
Amendment”).
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within a broader normative framework. The content neutrality doctrine is rooted
in an underlying conception of autonomy. When individuals act within the scope
of their own autonomy, government may not intrude into this realm by regulating
the content of thought or expression. Nor may government interfere with the
collective autonomy of citizens by imposing unjustified restrictions on public
debate. Some acts of speech, however, should be regarded as invading the
autonomy or rights of others (as in the case of threats causing fear or incitement
promoting violence). In such cases, the rationale for content neutrality no longer
holds; in regulating speech, the government is not invading the autonomy of the
speaker or the community, but instead is protecting the rightful freedom of others.
In short, I shall contend that the First Amendment permits regulation of speech
where necessary to protect the autonomy or rights of others. In this way, it may be
possible to harmonize the rule of content neutrality with the exceptions, and to
develop a principled approach for determining which should prevail in particular
cases.
After discussing the meaning of “content,” Part I sets forth the justifications for
the content neutrality principle. Part II then explores the appropriate limits of that
principle. Part III examines the shortcomings of content neutrality when it is treated
as the central principle of the First Amendment, divorced from the normative
framework that is developed here. Focusing on judicial efforts to deal with hate
speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul24 and with pornography in American Booksellers
Association v. Hudnut,25 I argue that the courts’ increasing reliance upon the content
discrimination doctrine to resolve difficult First Amendment problems only
obscures the crucial issues, and leads to hypertechnical decisions that are
inaccessible to the public. This approach not only gives short shrift to other values
affected by speech, it also fails to persuasively articulate and defend the values that
underlie the First Amendment itself. Finally, Part IV discusses how the theory and
doctrine of content neutrality should be reformed in order to avoid these difficulties
while preserving its important role in First Amendment jurisprudence.
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTENT NEUTRALITY
A. Introduction: On the Meaning of “Content”
Let us begin with the idea of content. While content is often identified with
what a speaker is saying, 26 this fails to capture the full range of the concept. We
must develop a richer, more multi-faceted view of content if we are to understand
the reasons why it is protected under the First Amendment, and what the limits of
this protection ought to be.
24

505 U .S. 377 (1992 ).
771 F.2d 323 (7th C ir. 198 5), aff’d mem ., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986 ).
26
See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U .S. 92, 96 (1972 ) (stating that First
Amendment precludes government from discriminating among speakers “on the basis of what
they intend to say”).
25
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The content we are concerned with is that of speech and other activity protected
by the First Amendment. The amendment protects both inward thought and
outward expression or communication. In turn, communication comprises the
following elements: (1) an act of expression by the speaker; (2) the speech itself;
and (3) its reception by the listener, which may have an impact not only on the
listener herself but also on others (such as an individual who is defamed by the
speech). Moreover, although these elements can be distinguished, they can also be
regarded as an integrated whole. Thus, the First Amendment is also concerned with
(4) the relationship that is formed through communication between the speaker and
listener, or within which the communication takes place.
Content can be understood in parallel terms. We can speak of the content of
inward thought as well as the content of outward expression or communication.
The content of communication includes: (1) its meaning for the speaker, that is, the
thoughts or emotions that he intends to express; (2) the objective content of the
speech;27 and (3) the meaning of the speech for those who hear it, or who are
otherwise affected by it.28 Finally, content can refer to (4) a shared meaning or
understanding that arises through communication. In short, it would be a mistake
to regard content as a single, undifferentiated concept. Instead, we can distinguish
between the content of speech for the speaker, for the listener, and for the two
together, as well as its objective content.
In this Part, I explore how each of these elements supports the principle of
content neutrality, by establishing a sphere of autonomy that is generally entitled
to protection against governmental interference.29

27

See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the senses in which content may be regarded as
“objective”).
28
This tripartite view of comm unicatio n may b e traced back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. See
A RISTO TLE , O N R HETORIC (George A. Kennedy trans., O xford U. P ress 19 91). Aristotle
identifies three means o f persuasion through speech, which he calls ethos, logos, and pathos.
Id. bk. I, ch. II, §§ 3-6, 1365a, at 37-39. F irst, speech can seek to persuade through “the
character [ethos] of the speaker,” which occurs “whenever the speech is spoken in such a way
as to make the sp eaker worthy of credence.” Id. § 4, at 38. Second, speech can persuade
through “the argument [logos] itself,” “when we show the truth or the apparent truth from
whatever is persuasive in each case.” Id. § 6, at 39. Finally, speech can persuade through
“disposing the listener in some way,” which occurs when “the hearers . . . are led to feel
emotion [pathos] by the speech.” Id. § 5, at 38.
29
A note on term inology: By “autono my” o r “liberty,” I mean the capacity for selfdetermination, that is, the ability to determine one’s own thoughts and actions, and to control
one’s perso n, withou t unwarranted interference b y others. An individual’s sphere of
autonomy is bounded by the autonomy of others. I take rights to be specific instances of
autonomy in general. For further discussion of this conception of liberty and its relationship
with rights, see infra text following note 1 75; S teven J . Heym an, Righting the Balance: An
Inquiry into the Found ation s and Limits of Freedo m o f Exp ression , 78 B.U. L. R EV . 1275,
1313-14 (1998) [hereinafter H eyman, Righting the Balance] (deriving this view from the
natural rights philosophy of Locke, Kant, and others).

2002]

SPHERES OF AU TO N OM Y

655

B. Content Neutrality and Freedom of Thought
Although the First Amendment does not expressly mention freedom of thought,
it is generally agreed that this freedom lies at the heart of what the amendment was
intended to protect.30 Perhaps the most powerful contemporary defense of this view
appears in Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Georgia,31 decided
only a few years before Mosley.
Stanley struck down a Georgia law that criminalized the possession of obscene
material even within an individual’s own home.32 In this setting, wrote Marshall,
the First Amendment liberty “to read or observe what [one] pleases” was reinforced
by another right fundamental to a free society — the right to privacy.33 In
challenging the statute, the defendant was merely asserting the freedom “to satisfy
his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.”34 The state
violated this right when it banned the private possession of obscene material in an
effort “to control the moral content of a person's thoughts.”35 Regulation of this
sort, Marshall declared, was “wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment”: “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds.”36
This language finds strong echoes in Justice Marshall’s later opinion in Mosley,
which also denies the right of government to “control” “thought” or its “content.”37
The conceptual and rhetorical parallels between the two cases suggest that the
Mosley doctrine rests in part on the principle developed in Stanley — that there is
an inward realm of thought and emotion into which the law generally is forbidden
to intrude.
As Stanley observes, this idea has deep roots in the liberal tradition. For John
Locke, the ability to form one’s own thoughts and beliefs lay at the foundation of
liberty. Liberty, or self-determination, was grounded in the capacity of human
30

See, e.g., Abo od v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 , 234 -35 (1 977 ); W est Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); T HOM AS I. E M E R S ON , T HE S YSTEM
O F F REED OM OF E X P RE S SIO N 21-22 (197 0). For the historical basis of this view, see Heyman,
Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1282-84, 1287 n.70, 1326 n.271.
31
394 U .S. 557 (1969 ).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 565.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 565-66. In a dramatic violation of this doctrine, a twenty-two -year-old Ohio man
named Brian D alton was recen tly sentenced to ten yea rs in priso n after pleading guilty to
possession of child pornography, which consisted merely of fantasies that he wrote in his
private journal. See Child Pornography Writer Gets 10-Yea r Prison T erm, N.Y. T IMES , July
14, 200 1, at A12. Citing ineffective assistance of counsel, D alton is currently seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea in order to raise the First Amendment issue. See Tim D oulin,
Journal Writer Appeals Ruling on Guilty Plea, C OLUMBUS D ISPATCH , Nov. 20, 2001, at 12B.
37
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972), quoted supra at text accompanying
note 5.
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beings to ascertain their own good and to direct their own actions through the use
of reason.38 Moreover, the beliefs that individuals hold cause no injury to others.39
For these reasons, Locke argued that thought and belief were inalienable rights.
When individuals entered into civil society, they necessarily conferred on the
community, and on the government that it established, jurisdiction over their life,
liberty, and property, for it was conflict over such external things that required the
formation of society in the first place.40 But there was no reason why individuals
should give up the freedom to think for themselves.41 It followed that the power of
civil society and government did not extend to the internal realm of individual
thought and belief.42 Immanuel Kant drew a similar distinction, holding that the
power of law applied only to external actions and not to internal ones, such as
thoughts.43 Likewise, in On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argued that the rightful power
of society was limited to “the external relations of the individual,” and did not
extend to those matters that concerned only himself.44 At the core of this sphere of
autonomy was “the inward domain of consciousness,” including “liberty of
conscience, . . . thought and feeling.”45
In these ways, the liberal tradition sought to protect the inner life of human
beings from external interference and coercion. Over time, liberal thinkers
developed an increasingly rich and complex account of what this inner life
consisted of. In addition to rational self-determination, Locke understood it in
terms of “happiness.”46 Mill further developed this view, arguing that utility or
happiness should be understood in light of an ideal of self-development.47 In his
38

See J O H N L OCKE , A N E S S AY C ONCERNING H U M A N U NDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. X XI
(Peter H. Nidditch ed., Meridan B ooks 1975 ) (4th ed. 1700) [hereinafter LOCKE , E SSAY ];
J O H N L OCKE , T W O T R E AT IS E S O F G O V E RN M E N T , II § 63 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge U niv.
Press 1988) (16 98) [hereinafter LOCKE , T W O T REATISES ].
39
See J O H N L OCKE , A L ETTER C ONCERNING T O LE R AT IO N (W illiam Popp le trans., 2d ed.
1689), in P OLITICAL W RITINGS OF J O H N L OCKE 420 (David Wo otton ed., 1993) [hereinafter
L OCKE , T O LE R AT IO N ].
40
See L OCKE , T W O T REATISES , supra note 3 8, II §§ 87 , 127 -31; L O CK E , T O LE R AT IO N ,
supra note 39, at 422.
41
See L OCKE , E SSAY , supra note 38, bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 10, at 353.
42
See L OCKE , T O LE R AT IO N , supra note 39, at 394-95. For a fuller explo ration o f Lock e’s
view, see Steven J. Heyman, The Liberty of Rational Creatures: Lockean Natural Rights and
the Freedo m of Speech and Tho ught (No v. 1999 ) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
43
See I M M AN UE L K A N T , T H E M ETAPH YSICS OF M ORALS *214, *219, *230 (M ary Gregor
trans., 19 91).
44
J O H N S TUART M ILL, O N L IBERTY 10-14 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859) [hereinafter
M ILL, O N L IBERTY ].
45
Id. at 10-14.
46
See generally L OCKE , E SSAY , supra note 38, bk. II, ch. XXI. For a valuable discussion
of Locke’s view, see R OGERS M . S MITH , L IB E RA LIS M A N D A MERICAN C ON STITU TION AL L AW
18-35, 201-08 (1985).
47
See M ILL, O N L IBERTY supra note 44, at 10 (stating that he “regard[s] utility as the
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constitutional opinions, Justice Brandeis also connected the idea of happiness with
the development of human faculties, and argued that the inner life of individuals
should be protected for its own sake. In Olmstead v. United States,48 for example,
he wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.49
As Justice Marshall recognized in Stanley, this passage, although written in defense
of the right to privacy, applies with equal force to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment.50 Indeed, Brandeis’s rhetoric underscores the close relationship
that the liberal tradition has always perceived between those freedoms and the idea
of privacy.
In short, a central tenet of liberalism is that a boundary must be drawn between
the outward realm of the state and the inward life of the individual.51 And this
principle is one of the foundations of the First Amendment doctrine of content
neutrality. On this view, while the state may regulate external interaction between
individuals, it may not seek to control their thoughts and feelings — the content of
this internal realm. As Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,52 such state action “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit

ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded
on the permanent interests of man as a progre ssive being”); id. at 54 (arguing that “the free
development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being”); J O H N S TUART
M ILL, U TILITARIANISM ch. 2 (1 861 ), in T HE P H IL O S OPHY OF J O H N S TUART M ILL (M arshall
Cohen ed., 1961 ).
48
277 U .S. 438 (1928 ).
49
Id. at 478 (B randeis, J., dissenting). Although Brandeis, writing as a judge, attributed
this view to the Framers, it is actually more characteristic of the period in which he himself
lived. That is not to say, however, that this view cannot be seen as implicit in the earlier
liberal conception.
50
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U .S. 557, 564 (196 9) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478).
51
See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Two Conc epts of Liberty, in F OUR E S S AY S O N L IB E RT Y 124
(1969). Of co urse, this principle also underlies the Court’s decisions protecting individual
privacy under the Fo urth Amendme nt, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (196 7);
and, more controversially, under other provisions such as the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, see, e.g ., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (19 92); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v. W ade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (19 65).
52
319 U .S. 624 (1943 ).
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which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official
control.”53
C. Content Neutrality and Freedom of Communication
1. Speaker Autonomy and Self-Expression
Of course, the First Amendment ensures freedom not only “to think as you
will,” but also “to speak as you think.”54 Both are essential to autonomy. Through
speech, individuals express themselves and realize their inherent capacities as
human beings.55 Mosley endorses this rationale when it notes that free speech is
necessary “to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,”56 and when it cites Justice
Harlan’s observation in Cohen v. California57 that the First Amendment places “the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,” not
only to promote a “more perfect polity,” but also “in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.”58
This discussion points to further grounds for the content neutrality doctrine. In
one sense, content refers to the thoughts and feelings within a speaker’s mind; in
another sense, it refers to the same ideas and emotions as they are expressed through
speech. Government impairs individual autonomy and self-realization when it
restricts speech because it disapproves of the fact that the speaker holds certain
thoughts or feelings, or because it disapproves of the decision to express them.
Even when the government restricts speech for other reasons, the restriction violates
the speaker’s right to autonomy and self-fulfillment if those reasons are inadequate
ones. Likewise, the First Amendment bars government from compelling citizens
to speak, for this violates the “fundamental rule” that “a speaker has the autonomy
to choose the content of his own message.”59
At first glance, it might seem that the notion of speaker autonomy is capable of
supplying a complete justification for freedom of thought and expression. As Mill
concedes, however, when a person communicates with others, she affects others as
53

Id. at 642. For an account of free speech that focuses on the inviolability of individual
thought and belief, see D A V ID A.J. R IC H A R DS , T OLERATION AND THE C O N S TIT U TIO N chs. 6-7
(1986).
54
W hitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
55
See, e.g., C. E D W IN B AKER , H U M A N L IB E RT Y A N D F R E ED O M O F S P E E CH (1989);
M AR TIN H. R EDISH, F REED OM OF E X P RE S SIO N : A C RITICAL A NALYSIS ch. 1 (1984); Thomas
I. Emerson , Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Y ALE L.J. 877, 879-81
(1963) [hereinafter E merson, Gen eral Theory].
56
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U .S. 92, 96 (1972).
57
403 U .S. 15 (1971).
58
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
59
Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (citation omitted).
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well as herself.60 Thus, a full account of free speech and of content neutrality must
extend beyond the idea of speaker autonomy and include other elements, such as the
importance of the speech, the freedom of other individuals to hear it, and the social
dimension of expression.
2. The Speech Itself
The second element of communication is the speech itself — the words or
other symbols that the speaker uses to convey meaning to a listener. I shall refer to
this as the objective element of communication. Of course, in using this term, I do
not mean to imply that language has meaning other than for those who use it.
Instead, this element of communication is “objective” in several related senses.
First, when an individual expresses his thoughts and feelings in speech, he
transforms them from something that is internal and subjective into something that
is external and accessible to others. Second, in order to do so, the speaker generally
uses words or symbols that have relatively determinate meanings. Third, those
meanings are more or less widely understood in the community. Fourth, many acts
of speech refer to or make assertions about states of affairs in the social or natural
world, or seek to transform those states of affairs. Finally, some acts of speech refer
to, or contribute to the apprehension of, a truth that does not depend merely on the
subjective views of human beings.
Corresponding to this element is a second sense of “content” — not the
meaning of the speech for the speaker, but the objective meaning of the speech. Is
it legitimate for the government to regulate content in this sense? In particular, may
speech be restricted on the ground that it is false (apart from any impact this falsity
may have on the rights of others, such as their reputations)? It is true that, when the
government censors speech on this basis, it does not act on a ground that directly
contravenes the principles discussed in the previous section: the autonomy and selfexpression of the speaker. For the liberal tradition, however, government has no
more power to restrict the expression of views on this basis than it has to censor
them because it disapproves of people holding or expressing those views.
Liberal thinkers such as Locke and Mill regarded truth as at least partly
objective. On this view, of course, the government cannot establish what is true
through fiat. Furthermore, the best way to pursue truth is through the free use of
individual reason, as well as through open and unrestrained discussion.61 In this
process, force and compulsion have no legitimate place.62 To be sure, it does not
necessarily follow that open debate will lead to the truth. Many liberals, including
60

M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 44, at 13 (acknowledging that, strictly speaking, the
“liberty of expressing and publishing opinions” belongs not to “the inward domain of
consciousness,” but rather to “that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other
people”).
61
See L OCKE , T O LE R AT IO N , supra note 3 9, at 39 6; M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 44, ch.
2.
62
See L OCKE , T O LE R AT IO N , supra note 39, at 395.
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Locke and Mill, were skeptical about the ability of human beings to attain ultimate
truth.63 However, while free discussion is not a sufficient condition for the
attainment of truth, it is a necessary condition. No other path to understanding is
open to human beings, with their limited faculties for perceiving and articulating
truth.64 A similar view underlies Justice Holmes’ classic defense of the marketplace
of ideas in Abrams v. United States.65
Finally, Locke and Mill argued that, even if the state were capable of
authoritatively determining truth, it would not be justified in forcing individuals to
accept that truth. In his arguments for religious liberty, Locke contended that while
the power of the state “consists only in outward force,” “[a]ll the life and power of
true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind.”66 More
broadly, Mill argued that for truth to have the vital power to promote the mental
development of human beings, and to have a transformative effect on their
characters and feelings, it must be held not as “a dead dogma,” but as “a living
truth” that is present and vivid in the mind.67
In short, the traditional “search for truth” justification for free speech68 focused
not only on objective truth, but also on the effect that such truth had on the mind,
character, and imagination. Objective truth had little or no value for human beings
unless they subjectively believed it. This was the deepest reason why government
should not seek to impose beliefs through law, for the use of outward force would
undermine the very good that it sought to promote.
3. Listener Autonomy and Self-Realization
The third element of communication is the reception of speech by the listener
(or what is often called the “communicative impact” of speech).69 The listener’s
liberty is a mirror image of the speaker’s: just as the latter is entitled to express her
views, the former should have a right to hear them. This right also is rooted in the
notion of self-determination. The expression to which one is exposed plays a
powerful role in shaping the self and its inner life. Respect for autonomy dictates
that individuals should have broad freedom to decide for themselves what they wish
to see or hear.70 Access to information is also crucial for the exercise of practical
63

See L OCKE , E SSAY , supra note 38, bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 4, at 659-61 ; M ILL, O N L IBERTY ,
supra note 44, at 22, 44-46, 53-54.
64
See M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 44, at 21.
65
250 U .S. 616, 630 (191 9) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66
L OCKE , T O LE R AT IO N , supra note 39, at 395.
67
M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 44, at 34-42.
68
The phrase is M ill’s. Id. at 27.
69
For a discussion of communicative impact, see infra Part II.A-B.
70
For First Amend ment theories that focus o n listeners’ autonomy, see Thom as Scanlon,
A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 P H IL . & P U B . A FF . 204 (1972) [hereinafter Scanlon,
Theo ry]; David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 C O LU M .
L. R EV . 334 (1991). This autonomy interest ap plies less fully in the case of children,
however, than in the case o f adults. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997)
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choice by individuals.71 For these reasons, Stanley v. Georgia and other cases hold
that the First Amendment protects a “right to receive information and ideas.”72
Once more, the government invades a sphere of personal autonomy when it
unjustifiably restricts expression out of concern for the effect it may have on willing
listeners.
4. The Social Dimension of Communication
So far, we have been considering each element of communication — the
speaker’s expression, the speech itself, and its reception by the listener — on its
own. But these elements cannot be fully understood in isolation from one another.
Instead, communication should also be regarded as an integrated whole.
This phenomenon has recently been explored by the philosopher Charles
Taylor. In a series of illuminating essays, Taylor argues that the function of
communication is not merely to transmit information from one person to another.
Instead, speech transforms what is initially a matter of individual awareness into
one of common awareness.73 In this way, the matter being discussed “is no longer
just a matter for me, or for you, or for both of us severally, but is now for us, that
is for us together.”74 In other words, the aim of communication is not simply to
convey ideas, but to develop a shared understanding. At the same time,
communication establishes a relationship between the participants, a common
ground or “vantage point from which we survey the world together.”75 Thus, in
addition to its importance for separate individuals, speech also has an
intersubjective or social dimension.76
This insight points to another sense of “content,” and a further justification for
the content neutrality rule. Just as the inner lives of individuals constitute spheres
of autonomy, so do the relationships that arise through communication.
Government invades this realm when it attempts, without adequate justification, to
restrict communication between willing participants. This is true of speech that
(citing Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)) (noting that “there
is a comp elling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being o f minors”
by shielding them from harmful materials) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
71
See R EDISH, supra note 55, ch. 1.
72
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 , 564 (1969); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 866-68 (1982) (plurality opinion), and cases cited.
73
See Charles T aylor, Theories of Meaning, in 1 P HILOSOPH ICAL P A P E RS : H UMAN
A GENCY A N D L ANGUAGE 259-60, 263-66 (1985) [hereinafter T aylor, Theories of Meaning];
Charles Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, in P HILOS OP HICA L A RGUMEN TS 138-39 (1995)
[hereinafter Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods]; Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The
Liberal-Com mu nitaria n D eba te, in P HILOS OP HICA L A RGUMEN TS 189-90 (19 95).
74
Taylor, Theories of Meaning, supra note 73, at 259 (emphasis added).
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., Robin W est, Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect: A
Comment on G eorge Fletcher’s Constitutional Identity, 14 C A R D O ZO L. R EV . 759, 761
(1993).
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occurs in private conversations, and within such relationships as the family. And
it is also true of speech that takes place within the realm of public discourse.77 In
particular, the First Amendment sharply restricts the government’s power to
regulate the content of political speech.
This theme, which is central to modern First Amendment jurisprudence,
received its most influential expression in the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn.78
According to Meiklejohn, American democracy is founded on a “compact” that we
have made to be a self-governing people.79 Within the realm of democratic
deliberation, individuals must be free to form and express their own opinions, and
to consider the views of others, for only through full debate can the community
reach informed decisions on matters of public policy.80 Although the First
Amendment does not foreclose all regulation of speech, it does mean that “no
suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue
rather than another.”81 As Meiklejohn explains:
[T]he reason for this equality of status in the field of ideas lies deep in
the very foundations of the self-governing process. When men govern
themselves, it is they — and no one else — who must pass judgment
upon [the merits of ideas]. . . . Just so far as, at any point, the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or
opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue,
just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the
general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the
community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is
directed.82
In Mosley, Justice Marshall cites Meiklejohn’s view,83 which clearly represents
one of the key sources of the content neutrality doctrine. At the same time,
Marshall makes clear that the doctrine is not limited to political discourse, but also
extends to speech that promotes “the continued building of our . . . culture.”84 In
this respect, Mosley echoes the writings of Thomas I. Emerson, who argued that
77

For an illuminating account of the ways in which public disco urse can function “to
reconcile individual with collective autonomy” within a self-governing community, see
Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Refo rm o f Pub lic
Discou rse, in C ON STITU TION AL D OMAINS 268, 280 (1995).
78
See, e.g., A LEXANDER M EIK LEJ O H N , P OLITICAL F R E ED O M , T HE C ONSTITUTIONAL
P OWERS O F TH E P EOPLE (1960) [hereinafter M E IK LE JO H N , P OLITICAL F R E ED O M ]; Alexander
Meiklejo hn, The First Amendm ent is an Absolute, 1961 SU P . C T . R EV . 245.
79
M E IK LE JO H N , P OLITICAL F R E ED O M , supra note 78, at 15.
80
Id. at 24-26.
81
Id. at 26-27.
82
Id. at 27 (emp hasis ad ded ).
83
Police Dep’t v. M osley, 408 U .S. 92, 96 (1972) (“T here is an ‘equality of status in the
field of ideas’. . . .”) (quoting M E IK LE JO H N , P OLITICAL F R E ED O M , supra note 78, at 27).
84
Id. at 95-96.

2002]

SPHERES OF AU TO N OM Y

663

First Amendment protection extends “beyond the political realm” and “embrace[s]
the right to participate in the building of the whole culture, and include[s] freedom
of expression in religion, literature, art, science, and all areas of human learning and
knowledge.”85 These too fall within the domain of what I am calling the social
dimension of expression.86
I should make clear that, in bringing out this social dimension, I do not mean
to minimize the importance of the individual elements. Each is vital to a full
understanding of free expression. First Amendment liberty begins with an
individual’s autonomy with regard to her own thoughts and feelings. Through
expression, these thoughts and feelings are given an outward form, which may then
have an impact on the minds of listeners, who also should have autonomy to
determine what forms of expression they wish to see or hear. In this way, speech
involves interaction between two or more individuals. At the same time, the
participants may go beyond their own merely personal standpoints. Through
communication, they form relationships that give rise to shared understandings. In
this way, speech has a social as well as an individual dimension. And these
dimensions interact with one another. On one hand, much individual thought and
expression has meaning only within the context of language and culture, social
practices and institutions.87 On the other hand, individual expression plays an
important role in shaping the society and its culture. In these ways, each aspect has
its own integrity, and also exists in a dynamic relationship with the other.
D. Content Neutrality and the Right to Equality
To this point, we have focused on the substantive justifications for content
neutrality, or on the ways in which content-based regulation can violate the
substantive ideal of autonomy. But there is also another important justification for
content neutrality — one that focuses on the ideal of equality. 88
This ideal is implicit in the justifications we have already discussed.89 The right
to self-fulfillment through thought and expression is one that is shared by all
individuals, including both speakers and listeners. It follows that, when the
government unjustifiably restricts the exercise of this right by particular individuals,
it violates not only their right to free speech, but also their right to equal treatment.
Similarly, all members of society have a right to participate in political discourse
and to contribute to the broader culture. When particular citizens are denied this
right without adequate justification, that denial infringes their right to equality as
well as their substantive rights. Finally, while it is an overstatement to say that

85

Emerson , Gen eral Theory, supra note 55, at 883.
The most sophisticated exploration of this social dimension may be found in the work
of Ro bert C . Post. See, e.g., Post, C ON STITU TION AL D O M A IN S , supra note 77.
87
See, e.g., Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, supra note 73, at 133-36.
88
See, e.g., Karst, supra note 6 ; W illiams, supra note 17, at 666-76.
89
See Karst, supra note 6, at 23-26.
86
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“[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea,”90 the worth of
ideas generally should be determined by the people rather than by the government.
Government has no jurisdiction over ideas as such, apart from their impact on
rights.91 It is in this sense that “[t]here is an ‘equality of status in the field of
ideas.’”92
In these ways, First Amendment liberty and equality are closely related, and the
two often can be understood as two sides of the same coin. Yet the equality
justification is not simply redundant. Even when the state has authority to regulate
an act of speech (say, by imposing a reasonable regulation of time, place, and
manner), the state may not single out particular speakers or kinds of speech without
adequate justification. Such regulations violate the right to equality, and constitute
impermissible content discrimination. Mosley itself is a classic example. Because
the City of Chicago was unable to show a persuasive reason for permitting labor
picketing near a school while banning all other forms of picketing, the ordinance
infringed the right to equality, regardless of whether a ban on all picketing would
have violated the First Amendment.93
In this way, the equality justification has some independent force. Ultimately,
however, this rationale depends on the autonomy justification developed above. It
is only because thought and expression constitute spheres of autonomy that
government generally may not discriminate between different forms of speech and
thought. To put it another way, the doctrine of content neutrality finds its ultimate
basis in the First Amendment rather than in the Equal Protection Clause.
E. Conclusion
Although this account is little more than a sketch, it helps us to identify the
different meanings of “content,” as well as the different grounds for the principle
that speech may not be regulated based on content. The term “content” may refer
to: (1) the thoughts and feelings of an individual, which may be expressed through
speech; (2) the meaning of the speech itself; (3) the meaning that the speech has for
those who hear it; and (4) the shared meanings that arise through communication.
When the state unjustifiably regulates the content of speech, it invades the spheres
of autonomy surrounding the inner lives of individuals (the first and third elements),
as well as the relationships within which communication takes place (the fourth
element). Nor can such regulation be justified based on the second element, for the
state has no jurisdiction over meaning as such, but only over actions. In all these
ways, content regulation may violate the First Amendment.
90

Gertz v. Robert W elch, Inc., 418 U .S. 323, 339 (197 4).
See L OCKE , T O LE R AT IO N , supra note 39, at 420 (“[T]he business of laws is not to
provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the Commonw ealth, and
of every particular man’s goods and person.”).
92
Police Dep’t v. M osley, 408 U .S. 92 , 96 (1 972 ) (quo ting M EIK L EJ O H N , P OLITICAL
F R E ED O M , supra note 78, at 27).
93
Id. at 99-102.
91
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This idea of autonomy also helps to explain the scope of the neutrality doctrine.
Within the broad category of content-based regulation, a distinction is commonly
drawn between regulations based on subject matter and those based on viewpoint.94
The former restrict speech on an entire issue, while the latter restrict speech on one
side of the issue. For example, a ban on all demonstrations related to foreign policy
would be a subject-matter regulation, whereas a ban on demonstrations that oppose
the administration’s foreign policy would be a viewpoint-based restriction.95
At times, both justices and scholars have asserted that the content neutrality
doctrine is principally, or even exclusively, concerned with viewpoint-based
regulation.96 This position might make sense if the doctrine simply reflected a
concern that the government might abuse its power by restricting expression critical
of government officials or policies. For the most part, however, the Court has
understood the doctrine more broadly, holding that it applies not only to viewpointbased regulations, but also to those based on subject-matter — a rule which was laid
down in Mosley itself97 and reaffirmed in many subsequent cases.98 In my view, this
94

See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 51.
Id.
96
For exam ple, in W ard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (19 89), the Court
asserted that “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message
it conveys.” Id. at 791 (citation omitted). For similar statements, see Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (following Ward ); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to “the First Amendment’s central
proscriptio n against censorship, in the form of viewpoint discrimination”); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U .S. 50, 67 (1976 ) (plurality opinion) (maintaining that “[t]he
essence of [the Mosley] rule is the need for absolute neutrality by the governm ent; its
regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the poin t of
view being expressed by the communicator”) (emphasis added). For the view that the Mosley
doctrine should be limited to viewpoint disc rimination, see Stephan, supra note 1 7; see also
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 H ASTINGS C ONST . L.Q. 99, 115 (1996)
(asserting that “the truly compelling First Am endment princip le is viewpoint neutrality,” and
questioning the need for “a separate content neutrality rule”) (citation omitted).
97
According to Mosley, the First Amendment bars regulation of speech ba sed not only
on “its message [or] its ideas,” but also on “its sub ject matter, or its content.” Mosley, 408
U.S. at 95. In Mosley, no one argued that the ordinance constituted viewpoint discrimination.
Instead, it was struck dow n bec ause it drew an impermissible distinction based on “subject
matter.” Id. at 97.
98
See, e.g., Hill, 530 U .S. at 723 (“R egulation of the subje ct matter of messages, though
not as obno xious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an ob jectionable form of contentbased regulation.”) (c itation omitted); id. at 770 (Kenned y, J., dissenting) (a law violates the
content neutrality doctrine if it “seeks to eliminate public discourse on an entire subject”);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (hold ing ordinance unconstitutional
because “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“W e have held that
a regulation that ‘does no t favor either side of a po litical controversy’ is nonetheless
impe rmissible because the ‘First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends
95
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rule does not rest merely on the notion that subject-matter regulations may serve as
a cloak for viewpoint discrimination.99 Instead, the basic problem with subjectmatter restrictions is that they limit the liberty of citizens to control their own
expression.100
II. THE LIMITS OF CONTENT NEUTRALITY
The view developed in Part I allows us to identify not only the justifications for
content neutrality, but also the limits of that principle. The Mosley doctrine protects
the autonomy of speakers, listeners, and the community as a whole to determine the
content of their own expression. Content regulation invades this autonomy and
thereby violates the First Amendment.
But this doctrine loses much of its force where speech goes beyond the bounds
of a sphere of autonomy and infringes the autonomy of others. In regulating such
speech, the law does not abridge the liberty of the speaker, but rather performs the
core function of protecting the rights of others from violation. To express the point
another way, speech may never properly be regulated based on its content in senses
(1) or (2) — that is, because the government disapproves of a speaker’s holding or
expressing a particular view, or disapproves of the idea itself. As I shall show,
. . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.’”) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm ’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
99
For suggestions to this effect, see M adsen v. W ome n's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
794 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that
the “vice of content-based legislation — what renders it deserving of the high standard of
strict scrutiny” — is that “it lends itself for use” for “invidious, thought-control purposes”)
(emp hasis and citations omitted); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 4849 (1986) (asserting that “the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about
‘content-based’ speech regulations” is “that ‘government may not grant the use of a forum
to people whose views it finds accep table, b ut deny use to tho se wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views’”) (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-9 6); id. at 57
(Brennan, J. dissenting) (“[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental
action must be scrutinized m ore carefully to e nsure that com munication has not been
prohibited merely because public o fficials disap prove the sp eaker’s views.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100
The idea of autonomy also shows why the First Amendment’s protections extend far
beyond a concern w ith content regulation. Suppose, for example, that the government enacted
a law barring a certain class of persons from speaking in public places. Such a law might well
have the purpose or effect of restricting the expression of particular views, or of speech on
particular subjects. Even if it did no t, however, it clearly should be regarded as a violation
of the First Amendm ent beca use of its restriction o n the liberty of particular ind ividuals to
engage in speech. Similarly, restrictions on expressive conduct or on the time, place, and
manner of expression can unduly limit freedom of speech, even when they do not have the
purpo se or effect of favoring some kinds of content over others. For this reason, even
content-neutral regulations sho uld be subject to serious review under the First Am endment.
See supra note 2 0 (describing the intermed iate review accorded to content-neutral
regulations).
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however, speech may sometimes be regulated based on content in sense (3) — that
is, because of the impact of the speech on those who hear it, or on others who are
affected by it.101
A. The Communicative Impact Approach to Free Speech
Of course, I recognize that this claim goes against the current of contemporary
First Amendment jurisprudence. According to the dominant view, the content of
speech may be identified with its communicative impact — that is, the effect that
it has on listeners or viewers. And the regulation of speech based on
communicative impact is precisely what the First Amendment forbids.
The seeds of this view may be found in the well-known case of United States
v. O’Brien.102 After burning his draft card to dramatize opposition to the Vietnam
war, O’Brien was convicted of violating a federal law that prohibited the willful
destruction of draft cards.103 On appeal, Chief Justice Warren emphasized that the
defendant had been convicted only for “the independent noncommunicative impact
of [his] conduct” — interference with the efficient operation of the selective service
system — and not because of any harm that might be thought to arise from “the
alleged communicative element” in his conduct.104 Without discussing the First
Amendment principles that should apply to the latter, the Court held that a less
demanding standard should apply to the former, and upheld O’Brien’s conviction.105
Warren’s distinction between the “communicative” and “noncommunicative”
aspects of expressive conduct proved to be influential. In his classic essay on flag
desecration, John Hart Ely argued that the distinction provided the key to First
Amendment analysis.106 “The critical question,” according to Ely, was:
whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out
of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more particularly
out of the way people can be expected to react to his message, or rather
would arise even if the defendant’s conduct had no communicative
significance whatever.107
Although regulations of the latter sort were sometimes acceptable under the First
Amendment, those of the former sort rarely were.

101

These different senses of “content” are explained supra Part I.A.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
103
Id. at 369-70.
104
Id. at 376, 382.
105
See supra note 20 (quoting the standard adopted in O’Brien).
106
John Hart Ely, Flag Desec ration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First A mendm ent A nalysis, 88 H ARV . L. R E V . 1482, 1496-1502 (1975)
[hereinafter E ly, Flag Desecration].
107
Id. at 1497 (citation omitted).
102
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For Ely, one of the virtues of the communicative/noncommunicative distinction
was that it offered a way to harmonize two First Amendment approaches that had
long been at war, commonly known as “absolutism” and “balancing.”108
Regulations based on noncommunicative impact were appropriately reviewed by
balancing the government interests served by the regulation against the effect on
speech.109 By contrast, a ban on regulations based on communicative impact was
rooted in the absolutist approach to the First Amendment that had been championed
by Justices Black and Douglas.110 Although Ely himself was sympathetic to the
absolutist approach,111 he acknowledged that it had never commanded a majority on
the Supreme Court.112 Moreover, in his later work Ely came to recognize that a pure
form of absolutism was untenable even in principle: “one simply cannot be granted
a constitutional right to stand on the steps of an inadequately guarded jail and urge
a mob to lynch the prisoner within.”113 For these reasons, Ely advocated the
adoption of “[a]nother, more viable, form of ‘absolutism’”: the view that the First
Amendment barred all regulation of communicative impact except where the speech
“falls within a few clearly and narrowly defined categories,” such as incitement and
libel.114 Ely did not offer any explanation of how these categories were to be
defined, however.
Ely’s approach was soon adopted by Laurence H. Tribe, who used it to structure
his account of First Amendment jurisprudence in American Constitutional Law.115
According to Tribe, the First Amendment generally barred regulation based either
on what the speaker was saying or on its effects on other people.116 He described
such regulation as “aimed at communicative impact,” and equated it with Mosley’s
concept of regulation based on content.117 For Tribe, as for Ely, this ban reflected
an “essentially” absolutist approach to the First Amendment, qualified only by
certain narrowly drawn exceptions.118
The Ely-Tribe approach has garnered widespread acceptance not only by
scholars, but also by the Supreme Court itself. Thus, in two landmark flag-burning
108

Id. at 1500-02.
Id. at 1486-8 7, 15 01-0 2.
110
Id. at 1493 n.44.
111
Id. (expressing inclination in favor of Black-D ouglas app roach, “subject to a limited
exception for demonstrable falsehoods regarding peop le or products”).
112
Id.
113
J O H N H ART E LY , D E M O C R AC Y A N D D ISTRUST 109 (19 80) [hereinafter ELY ,
D EMOCRACY ].
114
Id. at 109-110.
115
T RIBE , supra note 17, ch. 12 (1st ed. 1 978 ). Tribe’s analysis also drew on work by
Thomas Scanlon and Melville Nimmer, who developed their own versions of the distinction
between com municative and noncommunicative impact. Id. § 12-2, at 580 n.9, 581 n.15
(citing Scanlon, Theo ry, supra note 7 0; M elville B . Nimmer, The Meanin g of S ymbolic
Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. R EV . 29 (1 973 )).
116
Id. § 12-2, at 580-82.
117
Id. § 12-2, at 580-81 (emp hasis added).
118
Id. § 12-2, at 582-83.
109
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cases, Texas v. Johnson119 and United States v. Eichman,120 the Court equated the
“content” of expression with its “communicative impact,”121 and declared that the
“fundamental flaw” of laws against flag desecration was that they “suppress[]
expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact.”122 Similarly, in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell123 and other cases, the Court has asserted that
speech may not be restricted “because [it] may have an adverse emotional impact
on the audience.”124 At the same time, the Court has followed the “categorical
119

491 U .S. 397 (1989 ).
496 U .S. 310 (1990 ).
121
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315 -19; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 -12.
122
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317. For other instances of this approach, see Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001) (holding that a restriction on the height of indoor
cigarette advertising could not be justified as “a mere regulation of conduct,” because it was
“an attempt to regulate directly the communicative impact of [such] advertising”); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U .S. 703, 770 (200 0) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing a restriction on
abortion sidewalk cou nseling for “‘suppress[ing] expression out of concern for its likely
communicative impact’”) (quoting Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“W here the government
prohibits [expressive] conduct precisely because of its commun icative attributes, we hold the
regulation unconstitutional.”) (emp hasis in original); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
754 (1990) (B rennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that regulation of solicitation on post office
grounds was suspect because it was based on “the communicative impact of express ion”);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (holding that the First
Amendm ent does not protect acts of discrimination or other “potentially expressive activities
that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact”); M emb ers of C ity
Council v. Vincent, 466 U .S. 78 9, 82 8 (1984 ) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts
should not up hold regulations of speec h on aesthetic grounds un less there is “a reaso nably
reliable indication that it is not the content or communicative aspect of speech that the
government finds unaesthetic”); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502
(1980) (plurality opinion) (ob serving that, although “the government has legitimate interests
in controlling the noncommunicative aspects of [a ] med ium, . . . the First and F ourteenth
Amendments foreclose a similar interest in controlling the com municative asp ects”).
123
485 U .S. 46 (1988).
124
Id. at 55. For some other expressions of this theme, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 , 394 (1992); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 -12; B oos v. Barry, 485 U .S. 31 2, 32 1-22
(1988); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware C o., 458 U.S. 886 , 909-911 (19 82); Collin v. Smith,
578 F.2d 119 7, 12 06 (7th Cir. 197 8), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
This doctrine has so metimes be en taken to rem arkable lengths. For example, in Simon
& Schuster v. Memb ers of N .Y. State Crim e Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), the Court
reviewed the New Y ork “S on-of-Sam” law, which restricted the ability of criminals to profit
by selling their stories for publication. In an opinion striking the law down under the content
neutrality doctrine, Justice O’Connor summa rily rejected any justification for the law based
on an “interest in limiting whatever anguish [a criminal’s] victims may suffer from reliving
their victimization.” Id. at 118. To rely on such an interest, she said, would violate the
“bedrock [First Amendment] principle . . . that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society find s the idea itself offensive or d isagree able.”
Id. (quoting Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319 ; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414) (citation and internal
120
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approach” urged by Ely and Tribe, and has “permitted restrictions upon the content
of speech in a few limited areas,” such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting
words.125
Yet the basis for this categorical approach remains obscure. How are these
exceptions to be determined, and how can they be reconciled with the First
Amendment rule against content regulation? At times, the justices have been
content to invoke longstanding tradition.126 But the mere fact that exceptions are
traditional does not make them justified. In recent decades, the Supreme Court has
dramatically expanded the scope of First Amendment protections, and has steadily
narrowed the traditional exceptions. Thus, the question of whether particular
speech should receive constitutional protection cannot be resolved merely by
reference to history, but calls for a normative standard.
To identify such a standard, the justices have sometimes looked to Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire,127 which first formulated the categorical approach.128 In
Chaplinsky, the Court declared that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words — those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social

quotation marks omitted).
Another striking examp le is provided by Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995), in which the Court reviewed a state bar association rule that imposed a thirty-day
restriction on targeted direct-ma il solicitation of accid ent victims and their relatives.
Although the Court upheld the provision, four justices dissented. Rejecting the notion that
the regulation could be justified based on a concern “that victims or their families will be
offended by receiving a solicitation during their grief and trauma,” the dissenters wrote that
the Court’s decisions “do not allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that
the expression might offend the listener. On the contrary, we have said that these ‘are
classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First
Amendment.’” Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting C arey v. Pop ulation Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)). For further criticism of this tre nd in First Amendment doctrine,
see C ATHARINE A. M AC K IN N O N , O N LY W ORDS 105, 145 n.63 (1993).
125
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83.
126
See, e.g., id. at 383 (characterizing exceptions as “traditional limitations” on First
Amendm ent freedoms); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 127 (K ennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (describing exceptions as “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the
bar”).
127
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
128
See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U .S. at 382-83 (invoking Chaplinsky); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 776 (1982) (B rennan, J., concurring in judgment) (same).
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value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 129
Implicit in Chaplinsky is the notion that categorical judgments about First
Amendment protection should be made by weighing the social value of the speech
against the harm it causes to other social interests.130 At times, this balancing
approach has been made explicit. In New York v. Ferber,131 for example, the
majority asserted that “a content-based classification has been accepted [when] it
may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given
classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any,” that the speech should denied constitutional protection.132 This
approach, which has been labeled “definitional balancing,” has been advocated by
scholars including Melville Nimmer133 and Laurence Tribe.134
Whatever the merits of this approach, it is difficult to see how it can be
harmonized with the basic doctrine of content neutrality. As we have seen, that
doctrine is rooted in the absolutist jurisprudence of Justices Black and Douglas and
in the free speech theories of Meiklejohn and Emerson.135 For Mosley, speech is
protected not merely for instrumental reasons, but also because of its intrinsic value.
An interest-balancing approach rests on entirely different premises. Speech is
protected only because, and to the extent that, it promotes social welfare. Under
that approach, a class of speech should not be protected if its social value is
outweighed by the social harm that it causes. It is reasonable to believe, however,
that there are many kinds of speech that on balance cause more harm than good. If
balancing is taken seriously, then, it seems most unlikely to be consistent with a rule
129

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
As the Co urt indicated, id. at 572 nn.4 & 5, its dictum was drawn from ZECHARIAH
C HAFEE , J R ., F REE S PEECH IN THE U N IT E D S TATES 149-50 (19 41). In Chafee’s work, the
balancing metho dolo gy is clear. Id. at 149 (stating that the “social interest” injured by speech
“must be weighed in the balance” aga inst the “countervailing social interest in the attainment
and dissemination of truth”). For a discussion of balancing in post-World W ar I Progressive
free speech jurisprudence, of which Chafee was the lead ing academ ic exponent, see D avid
M . Rabb an, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 T EX . L. R EV . 951 , 101 8-19
(1996).
131
458 U .S. 747 (1982 ).
132
Id. at 763-64 .
133
See M ELVILLE N IM M E R , N IM M E R O N F REED OM OF S P E EC H (1984); Nimmer, supra note
115.
134
See T RIBE , supra note 17, § 12-2, at 792-93. As Pro fessor T ribe expresses the p oint,
“[a]ny exclusion of a class of activities from first amendment safeguards represents an
implicit conclusion that the governmental interests in regulating those activities are such as
to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free expression of ideas. Thus, [such]
determinations . . . presup pose som e form of ‘balancing’ whether or no t they appear to do
so.” Id.
135
See supra text accomp anying notes 78-85 (Meiklejohn and Emerson) and 110-18
(Black and Do uglas).
130
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that speech may rarely if ever be regulated because of its communicative impact.
In short, far from resolving the question of how exceptions are to be justified, the
appeal to balancing only makes the problem seem more intractable.
For Ely, an important advantage of the categorization approach was that it
would obviate the need for ad hoc balancing in particular cases — an approach that
he, like many others, regarded as inadequate to protect freedom of speech,
particularly in times of national crisis.136 Departing from Ely’s view, the Court in
Simon & Schuster declared that even fully protected speech may be subjected to
content-based regulation if the requirements of strict scrutiny were met.137
Although this position met with strong criticism from Justice Kennedy,138 the
majority offered no reasoned explanation for its view. 139
To summarize, the communicative impact approach to the First Amendment has
become the prevailing view both on and off the Court. This view identifies contentbased regulation with regulation based on communicative impact, and holds that
such regulation is forbidden by the First Amendment. At the same time, however,
it is clear that there are instances in which the communicative impact of speech
justifies regulation. Recognizing this, the dominant approach would permit
regulation in some cases. But neither courts nor scholars have been able to offer a
satisfactory account of how these exceptions are to be determined, or how they can
be harmonized with the general rule. In all of these ways, First Amendment
jurisprudence finds itself in a quandary.
B. Reconsidering the Role of Communicative Impact
To escape from this predicament, we must return once more to the notion of
content. As we have seen, Ely holds that the “critical question” is “whether the
harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the
defendant is communicating, and more particularly out of the way people can be
expected to react to his message.”140 In light of the discussion in Part I, we can see
that this formulation contains two distinct elements. The first, “the fact that the
defendant is communicating” — or, as Ely also puts it, “what the defendant was
saying” 141 — corresponds to what I have called the second element of
communication, the speech itself, while the latter part of his statement, “the way
people can be expected to react to his message,”142 corresponds to the third element,

136

See E LY , D EMOCRACY , supra note 1 13, at 109 -16; E ly, Flag Desecration, supra note
106 , at 150 0-1.
137
Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991).
138
Id. at 124 (K ennedy, J., co ncurring in jud gment).
139
Id. at 118.
140
Ely, Flag Desecration, supra note 106, at 1497.
141
Id.
142
Id.
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the reception of the speech by its audience. In this way, Ely conflates two different
elements of communication.
Of course, these elements are closely related to one another. But the distinction
between them takes on crucial importance when one is trying to understand the
basis and limits of content neutrality. The government, I have contended, may
never regulate speech merely because it disapproves of the fact that the speaker
holds particular views, for this would violate the speaker’s autonomy.143 Nor may
speech be regulated merely because of disapproval of the ideas themselves, because
government has no jurisdiction over the realm of ideas as such.144 But the question
of whether speech may be regulated to protect listeners is more complex.
As we have seen, both speakers and listeners have a right to autonomy. Just as
a speaker is entitled to determine the content of his own expression, other
individuals have a right to decide whether they wish to hear it. It follows that
government may not regulate the content of speech in order to protect willing
listeners, for that would violate their autonomy.145
At first glance, it might also appear that, on this view, individuals have a right
to be free from all unwanted communication. But such a conclusion would be far
too broad. For example, citizens have a right to engage in expression on matters of
public concern — a right that is especially strong in public places. Moreover, this
right is not limited to politics, but extends to art, culture, morality, religion, science,
and other matters of common concern. When expression of this sort is directed to
the public at large, it does not lose First Amendment protection simply because
some (or even most) individuals object to hearing it. Instead, as Justice Harlan
declared in Cohen v. California,146 “[t]he ability of government, consonant with the
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . .
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.”147
These principles derive, in part, from the social dimension of expression.
Speech is not merely individual but social in nature.148 For this reason, speech that
is properly directed toward the community as a whole, and that does not violate the
rights of individuals, may not be restricted for purely private reasons. Moreover,
speakers should have some latitude to attempt to communicate directly, on matters
of general concern, even with individuals who initially may be unwilling. Citizens
should have a right to presume that other individuals are interested in
communicating on matters of common concern, until a particular listener makes
clear that he is not.
Ultimately, however, there cannot be an unlimited right to force communication
on an unwilling individual if the idea of listener’s autonomy is to have any meaning.
143
144
145
146
147
148

See supra Part I.C.1.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.3.
403 U .S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 21 (citation omitted ).
See supra Part I.C.4.
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Speech of this sort can violate the listener’s rights in two different ways. First,
regulation is justified in some cases simply to protect “[t]he unwilling listener’s
interest in avoiding unwanted communication.”149 As the Supreme Court recently
observed in Hill v. Colorado,150 this interest is an aspect of privacy, or what Justice
Brandeis called the “right to be let alone.”151 Although this interest is at its
strongest within the home,152 the Court has also recognized its force in other
situations where “‘the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.’”153 In Hill, for example, the Court upheld a
statute that made it unlawful to knowingly approach within eight feet of a person
entering an abortion clinic or other medical facility, without that person’s consent,
for purposes of “‘engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.’”154 This
regulation, the majority concluded, was justified to protect the “the interests of
unwilling listeners.”155
Forced communication is wrongful because it disregards the recipient’s capacity
for free choice, and disrespects the boundary that separates the self from others. I
shall call this sort of injury formal. In principle, at least, such injury is independent
of the content of the unwanted communication.156
In other situations, however, speech can inflict substantive injury on the
listener. In such cases, speech causes injury precisely because of its content or
communicative impact. Thus individuals can be placed in terror by threats of
present or future violence. Likewise, a person may suffer severe distress upon
being told (falsely) that a loved one has been gravely injured or killed.157 In such
149

Hill v. C olorado , 530 U.S. 703 , 716 (2000).
530 U .S. 703 (2000 ).
151
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 , 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted
in Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-17.
152
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ban on demonstrations
stationed in front of an individual’s residence); Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (upholding statute that allowed individuals to direct the post office not to deliver ma il
they deemed to be obscene).
153
Hill, 530 U .S. at 71 3 (quoting Erzn oznik v. City of Jacksonville, 4 22 U .S. 20 5, 209
(1975)).
154
Id. at 707 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3) (1999 )).
155
Id. at 718.
156
Id. at 716 (suggesting that “it may not be the content of the speech, as much as the
deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies proscription”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). As the examples of Rowan, Frisby, and Hill indicate, however, ju dgm ents
about whethe r spee ch is an invasion of privacy often depend in part on the content of the
speech. Those cases allo w the go vernm ent to protect individuals not from all unwanted
communication, but rather from communication that is unwanted because it is highly personal
or offensive . Simila rly, the tort of invasion of privacy through “intrusion upon seclusion”
does not protect against all unwelcome intrusions, but only against those that “would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.” R ESTATEMENT (S E C O N D) OF T ORTS § 652B (1977).
157
For a classic case which contributed to the development of the new tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, see Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] Q.B.D. 57.
150
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cases, the injury flows directly (in Ely’s words) from “what the defendant was
saying,” and “more particularly [from] the way [the listener] can be expected to
react” to it.158
Opponents of regulation might respond in several ways. First, they might deny
that mere words can cause injuries to others, or at any rate that speakers should be
regarded as responsible for such injuries.159 Individuals can control their own
speech, but they cannot control the way that others respond to it. Respect for the
autonomy of both speakers and listeners dictates that “[a]ny consequences involved
in the listener's reaction . . . must be attributed, in the end, to the listener”;160 speech
is only “as powerful as the audience allows it to be.”161 For these reasons, injuries
that depend on “mental intermediation” cannot justify regulation of speech.162
It is certainly true that, where free speech is at stake, notions of causation and
responsibility must be carefully confined. Thus, for the most part, modern First
Amendment doctrine allows regulation only where there is a close relationship
between speech and injury.163 Nevertheless, the assertion that speech should never
be regarded as responsible for causing injury is far too broad. For example, an
individual who receives a threat of violence will envision the impending danger,
and this will cause him to experience fear or at least apprehension (that is, a
cognitive awareness that he is in danger).164 Such reactions are not merely
instinctual but rational, for only in this way can one assess the danger and react to
it. Thus, speech of this sort inevitably has effects on the listener, effects that are not
(fully) within the latter’s control.165 At least where the speaker intends to produce
those effects, she should be regarded as responsible for causing them. One can hold
otherwise only by focusing on some elements of speech (the speaker’s selfexpression or the objective meaning of the speech) in isolation from others (the
speech’s effect on the listener and the intersubjective nature of communication).
But viewing the elements in this way overlooks the fact that they also constitute an
integral whole. A person who communicates her thoughts and feelings to another
158

Ely, Flag Desecration, supra note 106, at 1497.
See, e.g., C. Edwin B aker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. C AL. L. R EV . 979,
989 -92 (1 997 ).
160
Id. at 992 (citation omitted).
161
Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-28 (7th C ir. 198 5), aff’d mem .,
475 U.S. 100 1 (1986 ).
162
Id. at 329.
163
For example, under Bra nde nbu rg v. O hio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), speech
that advocates law violation may be restricted only where it is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Id. at 447.
Similarly, Cha plinsky v. Ne w H ampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), holds that speech may be
restricted as “fighting words” only when it “tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.” Id. at 572.
164
See R E S TA T EM E N T , supra note 1 56, § 21, comm . b (explaining that the injury
requirement for the tort of assault is satisfied by “apprehension” of an imminent unlawful
contact, even if the plaintiff suffers no fear).
165
See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1342.
159
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generally intends to produce some effect.166 Communicative impact is not an
accidental, but an essential feature of communication. Indeed, this is one reason
why the First Amendment generally protects communicative impact. However, just
as speech can have beneficial effects on listeners, it can also have harmful effects.
When these effects are intentionally imposed on an unwilling listener, the speaker
should be regarded as responsible for causing them.
Alternatively, opponents of regulation might concede that speech can cause
mental or emotional injuries, but deny that such injuries are serious ones. This
response runs contrary to common sense — most people would experience fear
upon receiving a threat of violence, or intense grief at news of a loved one’s death,
and would regard these as serious injuries. The response also runs contrary to the
view taken by tort and criminal law, which (at least in the absence of free speech
concerns) often treat such statements as unlawful, and subject them to liability
under the heading of assaults, threats, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.167 Finally, this response is inconsistent with the premises of First
Amendment theory itself. That theory rests in part on the notion that the thoughts
and feelings of individuals have important value. If that is true of speakers,
however, then it is equally true of listeners and others affected by speech. But just
as speech is capable of expressing the speaker’s thoughts and feelings, it is capable
of injuring those of others. And this may constitute a serious injury.
Finally, it might be argued that even if expression is capable of inflicting
serious harm, that harm does not justify restrictions on free speech.168 This
argument might appeal to the notion that, in a liberal society, individuals have
fundamental rights that may not be restricted simply to promote the welfare of
others. Instead, any harm that speech causes to social welfare is simply the price
that we pay for a free society.
Although this argument has considerable force in general, it has two fatal flaws
in the present context. First, many of the injuries that I am discussing are not to
society in general, but to particular individuals. Second, these injuries are not mere
“harms,” that is, setbacks to welfare, but constitute “injuries” in the strict sense —
that is, violations of rights.169 For example, threats of death or serious bodily harm
invade the target’s right to personal security, while falsely telling a person that her
husband has died violates her right to be free from intentional and unjustified
attacks on her emotional well-being. My contention is that, under the First
166

See J.L. A U ST IN , H O W T O D O T H IN G S W IT H W ORDS 101 (2d ed. 1975 ) (“Saying
something will often, or even norm ally, produce certain consequential effects upon the
feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other p erson s: and it
may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them . . . .”).
167
See, e.g., R E S TA T EM E N T , supra note 1 56, § § 21 , 46 (d efining torts of assault and
intentional infliction of emotional distress); M OD EL P EN AL C O D E A ND C O M M EN TA RIES §
211 .3 (1980) (providing that it shall be a felony to threaten to commit any crime of violence
with purpose to terrorize another).
168
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1 59.
169
See O X F OR D E N G LIS H D IC T IO N A R Y 981 (2d ed. 1989 ), s.v. injury.
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Amendment, speech may be regulated based on communicative impact when it
unjustifiably violates the rights of others.
This approach to freedom of speech has deep roots in American constitutional
history.170 The eighteenth-century American understanding of free speech was
woven from many strands. Among the most important, however, was the natural
rights tradition. Liberty of speech, thought, and belief were counted among the
inherent and inalienable rights of individuals — rights that they would not part with
when they established civil society and government. Moreover, freedom of speech
was a right that would be retained by the citizens of a republic in order to supervise
the government and check abuses of power. As an inalienable right, free speech
was not subject to regulation for the common good in the way that more ordinary
forms of liberty were. Yet the freedom of speech was not absolute. Instead, like
other fundamental rights, it was limited by the rights of others. Speech that invaded
those rights (for example, by unjustifiably defaming others) was wrongful and
subject to regulation by law. In imposing such regulation, the government did not
violate freedom of speech, but rather fulfilled its duty to protect the rights of other
individuals.171 This understanding of free speech informed the adoption not only
of the First Amendment, but also of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided the
basis for applying the First Amendment to the states.172
In addition to this historical foundation, there is a strong normative basis for the
principle that free speech is limited by other rights. For the liberal tradition, it is
axiomatic that an individual’s liberty is bounded by the equal liberty of others.173
As Mill recognizes, this principle applies to free speech no less than to other forms
of liberty.174 To be sure, there are some cases in which speech has such important
value that it should take precedence over other rights. But one can reach this
conclusion only after comparing the value of a particular kind of speech with the
value of the right with which it conflicts. There is no warrant for holding that
speech always trumps other rights.
The crucial question then becomes, what are the other rights that may set
bounds to free speech? Here I shall summarize an account that I have developed
elsewhere — an account which draws on the natural rights background of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as on our own contemporary understanding
of fundamental rights.175 On this view, rights are specific instances of liberty, which
in turn is understood as autonomy or self-determination. Rights represent what it
means to be a free person in various realms of human life. Our conception of
liberty begins with what it means to be free in the external world. External freedom
encompasses the right to control one’s own body and actions, as well as to acquire,
170

See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1282-98.
On the duty to pro tect rights, see Steven J. H eyman, The F irst Du ty of G overnm ent:
Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 D UKE L.J. 507 (19 91).
172
See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1296-98.
173
See, e.g., L OCKE , T W O T REATISES , supra note 38, II § 6; K A N T , supra note 43, at *230.
174
M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 4 4, at 53 , quoted infra note 278.
175
See generally Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29.
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use, and dispose of external things. The liberties protected by the First Amendment
can be understood in part on this level. Freedom of mind is an aspect of the right
to one’s person, while the freedom to speak falls within the broader liberty to act
as one likes. But the idea of external freedom also encompasses other rights —
above all, the right to personal security, which can be infringed by incitement and
threats of violence. In this way, the same principles that justify free speech also
give rise to other rights which set bounds to that freedom.
Although our notion of liberty may begin with external rights, it does not end
there. If we ask why human beings have rights to life, liberty, and property, the
answer (at least in part) is that they are beings capable of self-determination. Thus
external freedom is rooted in inner freedom or self-direction. This points to a
second category of rights — rights of personality, which enable an individual to
develop and express herself and to interact with other persons. Once again, First
Amendment freedoms may be understood in these terms: individuals should be free
to develop their own thoughts and feelings and to express them to others. And once
more, this justification extends beyond liberty of speech and thought to support
other rights as well. Respect for the integrity of personality dictates that an
individual should be free from intentional assaults on her mental or emotional wellbeing; from unwarranted intrusions into her privacy, which represents the boundary
between the self and the world; and from unjustified attacks on her reputation, or
the social aspect of personality. For these reasons, the law is justified in protecting
against intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and
defamation, even when these injuries are inflicted through speech.
Individual liberty finds protection and flourishes within an organized
community. As citizens, individuals have a right to participate in collective selfdetermination and other aspects of community life. One of the most important ways
in which they do so is through free speech. At the same time, those who take part
in common activities have an obligation to respect the rights of other participants
and the community as a whole. This obligation is violated, for example, by
intentionally making false and defamatory statements about others in public debate,
for speech of this sort violates not only their own rights but also those of the
community, by undermining the integrity of public discourse on which democratic
self-government depends.176
By this point, the underlying form of the argument should be clear. To justify
freedom of speech and thought, one must appeal to notions of freedom that go
beyond these rights. That is not to say (as some theorists have argued) that freedom
of speech and thought have no intrinsic value.177 Instead, the point is that, to give
176

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (observing that “[t]he use of calculated
falsehood” in political debate is “at odds with the premises of democratic government” and
is outside the protection of the First Amendment) (citation omitted).
177
See S T A N LE Y F ISH , T HERE 'S N O S U C H T HING A S F REE S PEECH A N D I T 'S A G O O D T H IN G ,
T O O (1993); Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. C OLO . L. R EV . 106 1 (1993 ), reprinted in S T A N LE Y F ISH , T H E T RO UB LE
W IT H P RINCIPLE 93 (1999).
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a satisfying account of this value, we must recognize that free speech and thought
are not isolated rights, but are part of a broader conception of what it means to be
a free person. The justifications that we give for free speech and thought must
invoke this more general conception of freedom. But this conception is broad
enough to encompass not only free speech, but also such rights as personal security,
privacy, and reputation. Because the latter rest on the same grounds as free speech,
they are of the same general order of value. For these reasons, speakers generally
must respect these other rights.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that free speech must always yield
to other rights. To begin with, a speaker generally should not be held responsible
for violating other rights unless he acts with a particular state of mind (such as
intent or recklessness).178 Moreover, in some cases the value of speech is so great
as to justify overriding another right. A classic example is New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,179 in which the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional privilege to
engage in good-faith criticism of the conduct of public officials, even if the
criticism should prove to be false and defamatory. 180 When no such privilege is
justified, however, speakers can properly be held responsible when, acting with the
requisite state of mind, they speak in a way that violates the fundamental rights of
others.
In conclusion, content neutrality is grounded in a conception of autonomy.
Government may not intrude into the inward thoughts and feelings of individuals,
nor may it regulate speech because it disapproves of the speaker’s holding or
expressing the views in question, because this would violate the speaker’s
autonomy. Nor may government seek to protect willing listeners from the
communicative impact of speech, for this would violate their own autonomy. The
case is quite different, however, where the communicative impact of speech causes
serious and unjustified injury to an unwilling listener. In that case, the speech goes
beyond the bounds of the speaker’s autonomy and invades that of the listener.
When the government regulates speech in such cases, it does not improperly
regulate content within the mind of a speaker, or a willing listener, or content that
is internal to the relationship between a willing speaker and listener. Instead, it acts
to protect an unwilling listener against injury. In so doing, the law performs its core
function of protecting the rights of others from violation.

178

W hat the relevant state of mind is will vary from one wrong to another, depending on
the value of the speech and of the other right (among o ther co nsiderations). For e xample, in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court held that, in light of the o verriding imp ortance of the speech in question, public
officials and other public figures should be permitted to recover for defamation only where
they can show that a stateme nt was kn owingly or recklessly false. Id. at 279 -80. B y contra st,
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 32 3 (1974 ), the Co urt found that where p rivate
figures were d efame d, the b alance cam e out so mewhat differe ntly, and that defendants could
be he ld liable for negligence. Id. at 347-48.
179
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
180
Id. at 266-83.
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C. Categories of Regulable Speech
The prevailing approach holds that speech may be regulated on the basis of its
communicative impact only in exceptional circumstances, yet is unable to explain
those exceptions. In this section, I argue that the rights-based approach set forth
above is better able to account for the structure of contemporary First Amendment
doctrine. At the same time, this approach provides a critical standard by which to
assess the Supreme Court’s decisions on whether particular categories of speech
may be regulated on the basis of content.
1. Threats and Incitement
The Court’s decisions make clear that threats of violence are not protected by
the First Amendment.181 As the Court recently observed in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul,182 the law prohibits such threats in order to “protect[] individuals from the fear
of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur.”183 In other words, such laws are necessary to
ensure the right to personal security. Speech can also violate this right in another
way — by inciting its audience to attack a third person.
As the cases of threats and incitement make clear, speech can cause injury to
the community as well as to individuals. Personal security is a right that inheres not
only in the particular individual who is threatened, but also in each and every
member of society. An assault on one is therefore regarded as an attack against all.
Accordingly, threats and incitement may provide the basis both for civil actions by
private individuals and for criminal prosecution by the state.184 In other instances,
speech can cause injury to the community or the state even when it inflicts no
cognizable injury on individuals. For example, threatening to destroy a government
building, or inciting others to do so, constitutes a wrong against the state, regardless
of whether particular persons are endangered. Likewise, committing perjury and
filing false tax returns are wrongful because they interfere with the administration
of justice and the tax system, respectively.
Of course, one of the overriding themes of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence is that the danger to free speech is greatest when the state seeks to
restrict speech in order to prevent some injury to itself.185 Courts must be vigilant
181

See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1 982) (“The F irst
Amendm ent does not protect violence” or “threats o f violence.”) (citation om itted); W atts
v. United States, 394 U .S. 705, 707 (196 9).
182
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
183
Id. at 388.
184
See, e.g., supra note 167 (citing Mo del Penal Code p rovision on terroristic threats);
W A Y N E R. L A F AVE , C RIM INAL L A W § 6.1 (3d ed. 2000 ) (describing crime of solicitation); id.
§ 6.7(a ) (describing liability for aiding and abetting crime by encouraging its commission).
185
See, e.g., E LY , D EMOCRACY , supra note 1 13, at 107 -09, 1 1-16 ; Vincent B lasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 CO LU M . L. R EV . 449 (1985).
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to ensure that speech is not suppressed merely because it is critical of the
government or offensive to the political views of a majority. It was for this reason,
among others, that Justices Holmes and Brandeis argued for a stringent
interpretation of the “clear and present danger” test.186 Their view was substantially
adopted in Brandenburg v. Ohio,187 which held that government may forbid speech
that advocates unlawful conduct or revolution only where such speech is “directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”188
There are thus strong reasons to hold government to the most rigorous standards
when it seeks to regulate speech directed against itself. This, however, should not
lead us to overlook the fact that some speech is wrongful because it causes injury
to the state or to the community at large. As Justice Brandeis observed in Whitney
v. California,189 while First Amendment rights “are fundamental, they are not in
their nature absolute,” but instead are subject to restriction where necessary “to
protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or
moral.”190 If there is a problem with this formulation, it is not that it recognizes
injuries to the state, but that it neglects to mention the infringement of individual
rights, which ought to be no less central to an account of free speech and its limits.
2. Insulting or Fighting Words
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,191 the Supreme Court recognized another
category of unprotected speech, “insulting or ‘fighting’ words,” which it defined as
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”192 Such words, Justice Murphy asserted, had “such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”193 While the
“fighting words” doctrine has been criticized for sacrificing individual liberty to
social order,194 I believe that it is defensible from a rights-based perspective.
Speech can provoke responsive violence in several ways. First, words can
constitute a form of wrongful aggression by conveying a “message of personal

186

See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 2 68 U .S. 65 2, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U .S. 61 6, 63 0-31 (1919) (Ho lmes, J., d issenting).
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395 U .S. 444 (1969 ) (per curiam).
188
Id. at 447.
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274 U .S. 357 (1927 ).
190
Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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315 U.S. 568 (1942).
192
Id. at 572.
193
Id.
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See, e.g., F R A N KL YN S. H AIMAN , S P E EC H A N D L AW IN A F REE S O C IE T Y 252-60 (19 81);
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Cam pus: A M ode st Proposal?, 1990 D UKE
L.J. 484, 5 08-1 4.
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injury and imminent violence.”195 Faced with such a threat to personal security, the
target may respond with force, or with abusive language that soon results in violent
confrontation. Second, insulting speech can provoke violence by attacking the
target’s dignity. In both cases, the speech violates the rights of the target as well as
the community’s right to the peace. Finally, speech can constitute a challenge to
fight. Even when this does not violate the target’s right to security (because the
challenge can be refused), it nevertheless threatens the public peace.
In recent decades, the Court has focused on the “breach of the peace” branch
of Chaplinsky,196 leaving it unclear whether speech may still be restricted on the
grounds that it “inflict[s] injury” “by [its] very utterance.”197 Recent decisions
indicate that this remains an open question.198
The way in which the question is framed will strongly influence the answer that
we give to it. If we approach the problem as it is formulated in Chaplinsky — as a
conflict between free speech and “the social interest in order and morality”199 — we
may be inclined to protect individual liberty by confining the social interest as
narrowly as possible, that is, to the prevention of imminent violence. But the
problem looks quite different when we view it as involving rights on both sides. As
the courts have increasingly recognized over the past century, the law should protect
not only external rights such as life, liberty, and property, but also personality rights
such freedom from intentional infliction of emotional distress.200 But speech clearly
can be used to inflict severe distress on others — for example, by falsely informing
another that a loved one is dead. If the Court were to overrule the “inflict injury”
branch of Chaplinsky, such speech might be protected by the First Amendment. In
my view, the law also should be allowed to protect personal dignity201 on the ground
that this is an essential aspect of what Brandeis once called the right to an “inviolate
personality.”202
For these reasons, I believe that a strong argument can be made for retaining
both branches of Chaplinsky.203 At the same time, it is crucial to ensure that this
doctrine is not used to suppress ideas. When speech seeks to communicate ideas,
no matter how controversial or provocative, it may not be restricted simply because
195

R.A.V. v. City of St. Pau l, 505 U.S. 377 , 408 (1992) (W hite, J., concurring in
judgment).
196
See, e.g., Go oding v. W ilson, 40 5 U .S. 51 8 (1972 ).
197
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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The Court was invited to reconsider the Chaplinsky definition in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U .S. 377 (1992 ), but found it unnecessary to reach the question. Instead, all of the
justices assumed, at least for purp oses o f argum ent, that the entire definition remains good
law. Id. at 381; id. at 401 (W hite, J., concurring in judg men t); id. at 432 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 .
200
See supra text following note 175.
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See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1373-74.
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Samuel W arren & Louis D . Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 H ARV . L. R EV . 193, 205
(1890).
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For a fuller discussion, see Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1369-75.
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listeners find those ideas offensive. The basic line to be drawn is between the bona
fide expression of ideas on one hand and personal abuse on the other.204
3. Defamation and Invasion of Privacy
Chaplinsky also mentions libel as an unprotected category of speech.205 In
contrast to insulting words, which injure their target directly, libel causes injury
indirectly by damaging an individual’s reputation, or the way that others perceive
her. Once again, while Chaplinsky explains the harm of defamation in terms of “the
social interest in order and morality,”206 the harm is better understood from a rightsbased perspective. Individual personality has an important social dimension. For
purposes of social interaction, an individual’s identity is largely determined by how
others view her. To make false statements about a person that lower her in the
esteem of the community constitutes a serious wrong to personality.207
Chaplinsky observed that laws against libel had “never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem” because such speech contributed little if anything to
the search for truth.208 As the Court came to recognize in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,209 however, the law of defamation can raise very serious constitutional
problems, for it imposes substantial restraints on free speech regarding matters of
public concern. For this reason, Justices Black and Douglas argued that such
speech should enjoy absolute protection under the First Amendment.210 Although
this position would give strong protection to free speech, however, it would unduly
sacrifice the right to reputation, a right that, in Justice Stewart’s words, “reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being — a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”211
Moreover, as Justice Brennan noted in Garrison v. Louisiana,212 “[c]alculated
falsehood” has no legitimate place in public debate.213
For these reasons, the Court declined to adopt an absolutist position and instead
recognized a series of qualified privileges. To protect good-faith criticism of
official conduct, New York Times held that a public official could recover for
defamation only on the basis of convincing proof that a statement was knowingly
204

Although this distinction will often be easy to draw, it becomes mo re problematic in
the case of ideas that them selves re flect hostility toward a person o r group (as in the case of
hate speech). For an exploration of whether the expression of ideas can inflict injury, see
infra text accompanying notes 270-78.
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Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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or recklessly false.214 Subsequent decisions extended this rule to lawsuits brought
by public figures.215 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,216 however, the Court
concluded that the balance between free speech and reputation should be struck
differently where the plaintiff was a private person. In such cases, the Court ruled,
defendants properly could be held responsible for false and defamatory statements
made without reasonable care.217 In this way, the Court has sought to achieve a
reasonable accommodation between the rights of free speech and reputation.218
Over the past century, the law has also come to recognize a right to privacy.219
By preserving the boundary between the self and the world, privacy allows
individuals to direct their own thoughts and actions and to cultivate a rich inner life,
free from undue interference by others.220 Invasion of privacy takes two main
forms: improper intrusion into an individual’s private life (e.g., through obscene
or harassing telephone calls), and unwarranted exposure of that private life to the
world (through publication of highly personal information).221 Of course, both
forms of invasion of privacy can be committed through speech.
As already noted, the Supreme Court has upheld some measures designed to
protect against intrusive forms of expression, such as demonstrations in front of a
person’s home.222 Yet the Court has consistently struck down efforts to protect
privacy in the second sense — for example, through laws that bar the media from
publishing the names of rape victims.223 The Court’s refusal to protect
informational privacy may be attributed to several factors: the justices’ discomfort
at recognizing new categories of regulable speech; the quasi-absolutist view that,
under the First Amendment, the state may rarely if ever regulate speech that is
true;224 and the modern tendency to frame First Amendment problems as conflicts
214

New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts & Associated Press v. W alker, 388 U.S. 130 (19 67).
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See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1332-36.
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See R E S TA T EM E N T , supra note 156, §§ 652B, 652D (defining the torts of intrusion
upon seclusion and unreasonable publicity to private life).
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See supra note 152.
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See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975).
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In Florida Star, the media de fendant urged the Court to ho ld that under the First
Amendm ent “the press may never be punished, civilly or criminally, for publishing the truth.”
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 531. Although the Co urt dec lined to rule on this contention, it did
hold that “‘if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful informatio n abo ut a matter of pu blic
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information,’” at least in the absence of “‘a need to further a state interest of the highest
order.’” Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))
(citation omitted).
The Co urt’s recent decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), expands the
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between the right to free speech and “state interests,” rather than other rights.225
When the issue is viewed from a rights-based perspective, however, it is clear that
privacy is no less deserving of protection than is reputation. Both are essential
aspects of the right to an “inviolate personality.”226 Individuals generally should be
entitled to decide for themselves whether to communicate highly personal
information to others. When the courts hold that, under the First Amendment, such
information may be published without consent, the subject’s right to autonomy is
improperly subordinated to the interests of the society (as well as the speaker). But
this position misunderstands the nature of the social realm and the social dimension
of expression. Rather than negating individual autonomy, society should be based
on respect for such autonomy.227 Communication generally should be voluntary.
In the case of highly personal information, however, the content properly belongs
to the subject of the information. When such information is published without
consent, the subject in effect is forced to be an unwilling speaker.
For these reasons, speech that infringes the right to privacy should be subject
to regulation, except where that right is outweighed by the value of the expression.
This is the crucial issue in such cases — an issue which is not illuminated by the
content neutrality doctrine.228
reach of this principle, but at the same time indicates some limits. In a six to three ruling, the
Court upheld the First Amendment right of a media defendant to broadcast a tape recording
of a private cellular telephone conversation regarding a matter of public concern, although
the defendant knew o r had reaso n to kno w that the conversation had been unlawfully
intercepted and recorded by a third party. In separate opinions, however, five justices
indicated that they would uphold a statutory ban on the disclosure of unlawfully intercepted
conversations in most cases, reasoning that such a ban served to p rotect not only an interest
in perso nal privacy, but also a First Amendme nt interest in p romoting p rivate sp eech. Id. at
535 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For further discussion
of Bartnicki, see infra text accompanying notes 233-43.
225
For criticism of this tendency, see H eyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at
1305-13.
226
W arren & B randeis, supra note 202, at 215.
227
See, e.g.,A L AN B RUDNER , T HE U NITY OF THE C O M M O N L AW : S T U D IE S IN H EGELIAN
J URISPRUDENCE 16-18 (1995) (emphasizing the interdependence of the individual and
community); G.W.F. H EGEL, E LEMENTS OF THE P HILOSOPH Y O F R IGHT § 261R , at 284-85
(Allen W. W ood ed., H.B . Nisbet trans., 1991) (same).
228
The Court also has adhered to the traditional view that obscenity is unprotected by the
First Amendment. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U .S. 49 (1973); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The rationale
for this view — that obscenity may be restricted to safeguard public and private morality —
is problem atic from the standpoint of a rights-based theory of the First Amendment. The
problem of obscenity is a complex one, however, which deserves a much fuller discussion
than it can receive here.
In recent years, the traditional liberal-conservative debate over obscenity has been
transformed by the rise of a new persp ective — the argument of some feminists that
pornography causes harm to women. A focus on such ha rm is the m ost plausible way to bring
the issue of pornography within a rights-based approach. This issue will be discussed below
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D. Conclusion
While content neutrality has an important place in free speech jurisprudence,
it is an overstatement to say, as the Court did in Mosley, that content may never be
taken into account.229 Instead, in deciding First Amendment cases, courts must
consider content in three important ways. First, the court must determine whether
a particular act is sufficiently expressive to be regarded as “speech” for First
Amendment purposes. This question is especially important in cases involving
symbolic conduct, such as draft card burning, 230 and other cases of nonverbal
conduct, such as erotic dancing.231 Second, a court must consider the impact of the
speech on unwilling listeners and third parties, in order to determine whether it
violates their rights.232 Finally, if the speech does infringe other rights, the court
must consider the value of the speech in order to decide whether it should
nevertheless be privileged under the First Amendment. This judgment also requires
a consideration of content.
The final point deserves elaboration, because it highlights a fact that is
generally overlooked — that it is sometimes necessary to take content into account
in order to afford greater protection to the most valuable forms of speech. This
point is well illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decision last Term in Bartnicki v.
Vopper.233 In that case, an unknown person illegally intercepted and recorded a
cellular telephone conversation, in which two officials of a teachers’ union
discussed a proposed strike and made vague threats to use violence against school
board officials.234 The tape recording found its way to Vopper, a radio
commentator, who played it repeatedly on his public affairs program,235 in violation
of a federal statute that made it unlawful to intentionally disclose the contents of a
communication that one knows or has reason to know was illegally intercepted.236
Invoking the statute, the union officials sued Vopper for broadcasting the tape; in
defense, he argued that the statute violated the First Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens observed that the statute was designed
to protect privacy and to encourage individuals to freely engage in private speech,
without fear that their conversations would be overheard by or disclosed to
others.237 Acknowledging that these were “interests of the highest order,”238 Stevens
left open the possibility that the statute would be held constitutional in most of its
in connection with Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut. See infra Part III.B.
229
Police Dep’t v. Mosley , 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1 972).
230
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (196 8).
231
See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M ., 529 U.S. 277 (20 00).
232
See infra Part II.C (discussing threats, incitement, fighting words, defamation, and
invasion of privacy).
233
532 U .S. 514 (2001 ).
234
Id. at 518-19.
235
Id. at 519.
236
18 U.S.C. § 25 11(1)(c) (1994 ).
237
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518, 532-33.
238
Id. at 518.
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applications.239 But he concluded that, under the First Amendment, the statute
could not be applied to a case like Bartnicki, which involved “the publication of
truthful information of public concern.”240 In reaching this conclusion, the majority
relied on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,241 in which the Court ruled that even if
the states could generally proscribe libel, they could not impose liability for goodfaith criticism of official conduct without violating the “profound national
commitment” to free debate on public issues.242
Thus, in both New York Times and Bartnicki, the Court drew content-based
distinctions in order to promote what it viewed as “the core purposes of the First
Amendment.”243 Of course, I do not mean to suggest that either courts or
legislatures should have carte blanche to make distinctions based on content.
Instead, the point is that, in situations where there are real differences in the value
of different forms of speech, or in the impact that they have on other rights, the
purposes of the First Amendment may best be served by recognizing those
differences in order to ensure that the most valuable forms of expression receive a
high level of protection.
III. CONTENT NEUTRALITY AND THE FL IG H T F RO M SUBSTANCE

239

Id. at 532. In separate opinions, five members of the Court clearly indicated that they
would take this position. See supra note 224 (discussing opinions of Breyer, J., and
Rehnquist, C.J.).
240
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534.
241
376 U .S. 254 (1964 ).
242
Id. at 270; see Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (discussing New York Times).
243
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533 -34. C onve rsely, a strict adherence to the con tent neutrality
doctrine sometimes can ha ve a sp eech-restrictive e ffect. Co nsider, for exa mple, the
development from Am algam ated F ood Em ployees Unio n v. Log an V alley Plaza , 391 U.S.
308 (1968), to Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (197 6). In Logan Valley, the Court held that
First Amendment rights extend not only to public property such as streets and parks, but also
to privately-owned shopping centers that are generally open to the public and that serve as
comm unity business districts. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319-20. On this ground the Court
uphe ld the right of labor union members to picket a business located in a privately owned
shopping center. A few years later, however, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (197 2),
the Court ruled that anti-war p rotesters had no First Amendment right to distribute leaflets
in a privately owned shopping center. The Court limited Logan Valley to speech related to
a shop ping center’s o perations. Finally, in Hudgens, the Court overruled Logan Valley and
rejected a First Amendment right of access even for picketing related to the operations of the
center. Citing Mosley, Justice Stewart observed that, under the First Amendment, no
distinctions could be drawn based on the content of speech. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520. From
this principle, he said, it followed that if the protesters in Lloyd C orp. “did not have a First
Amendm ent right to enter this shopp ing center to distribute handbills concerning Vietnam,
then the pickets in the present case did not have a First Amendment right to enter this
shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike” against a business located there.
Id. at 520-21. In this way, the neutrality principle was turned against the existence of broader
free speech rights.
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The first two parts of this Essay explored the foundations and limits of the
content neutrality doctrine. At the heart of the doctrine is the inherent value of
autonomy. When government regulates the content of communication that takes
place between willing individuals, and that affects no other rights, the regulation
violates the autonomy of both parties, as well as the integrity of the relationship
between them. Moreover, when a regulation improperly restricts public discourse,
it infringes the autonomy of the community as a whole.
The idea of autonomy also enables us to identify the appropriate limits of
content neutrality. Speech can violate the rights of others when it is forced on an
unwilling audience, or when the communication of its content inflicts certain kinds
of injuries on listeners. Speech can also violate the rights of third parties, as in
cases of incitement and defamation. In all of these situations, the speaker goes
beyond the bounds of his own autonomy and invades the autonomy of others. In
such cases, the rule against content regulation should not apply. And the same is
true of the ban on content discrimination. When speech violates other rights, this
provides a reasonable justification for treating it more restrictively than other
speech. To do so does not deny the speaker’s right to equality, for the duty to
respect the rights of others applies to all alike.
In short, the limits of content neutrality derive from the same principles that
justify the doctrine itself. Unfortunately, the courts have failed to recognize these
limits, at least in a clear and consistent way. Instead, when judges determine that
a law is based on the content or communicative impact of speech, and that the
speech does not fall within a few unprotected categories, they almost invariably
hold the law unconstitutional under the Mosley doctrine. In this way, the doctrine
has a powerful tendency to obscure what should be the central issues in many First
Amendment cases: whether the regulated speech violates the rights of other
individuals or the community; and if so, whether the speech should nevertheless be
protected because of its value.
In this Part, I explore how this failure to recognize the limits of content
neutrality has marred judicial efforts to grapple with two major First Amendment
problems — hate speech and pornography. These problems are highly complex,
and I do not suggest that a rights-based approach yields easy answers to them.
Instead, my contention is that, rather than illuminating these issues, the courts’
resort to the content neutrality doctrine has only obscured them.

A. Hate Speech: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
Recent years have seen an increasing concern with the problem of hate speech
— expression that is intended to insult or degrade others on the basis of race,
religion, or other characteristics.244 Many colleges and universities, as well as some
244

For collections of writings on hate speech, see H E N R Y L OUIS G ATES ET AL., S P E AK IN G
H ATE S PEECH , C IVIL R IGHTS , A N D C IVIL L IBERTIES (1994); M ARI
J. M ATSUDA ET AL., W ORDS THAT W O U N D : C RITICAL R ACE T HEORY , A SSAULTIVE S PEECH ,
O F R ACE , S PEAKING O F S EX :
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localities, have sought to regulate such speech on the ground that it causes serious
injury to its targets as well as to the community. The constitutionality of such
regulations was at issue in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.245
Together with several other teenagers, R.A.V. burned a wooden cross inside the
yard of an African-American family who lived across the street.246 He was arrested
and charged with violating a St. Paul ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to
“place[] on public or private property a symbol, object, . . . or graffiti, including, but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. . . .”247 On its face, the ordinance was clearly
overbroad, for speech does not lose First Amendment protection merely because it
causes “anger” or “resentment” in others.248 Relying on an earlier decision,
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the St. Paul ordinance was limited
to what Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire249 described as “insulting or ‘fighting’ words
— those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”250 When it was construed in this way, the state court
concluded, the ordinance was constitutional because it applied only to speech that
was unprotected by the First Amendment.251
A deeply divided Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the five-member
majority, Justice Scalia accepted the state court’s construction of the ordinance as
authoritative, and assumed that the law covered only unprotected fighting words.252
Nevertheless, he held the ordinance unconstitutional because, instead of proscribing
fighting words in general, it banned only a subset of fighting words — those “that
insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or

F IRST A MEND MENT (1993);1 H ATE S PEECH AND THE C ONSTIT U TIO N (Steven J.
Heyman ed., 1996 ).
245
505 U.S. 377 (19 92). In another leading case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit relied on Mosley in striking down several ordinances that were designed
to prevent a neo-Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois, a Chicago suburb with a large number of
Holocaust survivo rs. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir.) (citing Mosley, 408
U.S. at 98), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). For a discussion of the issues presented by
the Skokie case, see Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1382-88.
246
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379.
247
Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, M IN N . L EG IS .
C O D E § 292.02 (1990) [hereinafter St. Paul Ordinance]).
248
See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949 ).
249
315 U .S. 568 (1942 ).
250
Id. at 572. For the Minnesota decision, see In re the Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d
507, 510 (Minn. 1991). The state court also held that the ordinance was constitutional
insofar as it applied to expression that constituted unprotected incitement under
Bran denb urg. R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510.
251
R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 511.
252
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 .
A N D THE
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gender.’”253 Scalia concluded that this selective regulation violated the First
Amendment ban on content discrimination.254
R.A.V. provides a dramatic illustration of the ways in which an undue focus on
content neutrality can distort First Amendment analysis. As I have argued, a crucial
threshold question in free speech cases is whether the regulated speech unjustifiably
violates the rights of other individuals or the community. Speech that wrongfully
injures others falls outside the speaker’s autonomy, and thus outside the rule of
content neutrality.
Like most modern First Amendment opinions, R.A.V. does not speak in terms
of the other rights that may be affected by speech. Instead, in explaining why
fighting words are unprotected, Scalia quotes Chaplinsky’s assertion that such
words are “‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.’”255 Regardless of how the issue is framed, however, Scalia recognizes
(at least for purposes of argument) that fighting words cause unjustified injury both
to individuals and to society, and that for this reason they may be restricted based
on content.
Moreover, Scalia acknowledges that, within an unprotected category of
expression, some acts of speech may be more harmful than others. In such cases,
government may choose to regulate only the most harmful instances of unprotected
speech without violating the content discrimination rule.256 For example, a state
“might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive
in its prurience — i.e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual
activity.”257 But this raises the obvious question of whether the St. Paul ordinance
could be justified on the same ground: that it sought to regulate only the most
harmful forms of fighting words. Could not St. Paul reasonably determine (in
Justice Stevens’s words) “that harms caused by racial, religious, and gender-based
invective are qualitatively different from that caused by other fighting words,” and
therefore merit different treatment?258
Although Scalia’s response is not entirely clear, it appears to run as follows.
Fighting words cause harm, and are unprotected by the First Amendment, not
because of the “particular idea[s]” they express, but because of the manner in which
they express those ideas — that is, in such a way as to cause immediate injury or
violence.259 But the fact that the state may ban this manner of expression under
253

Id. at 391 (quoting St. Paul Ordinance, supra note 247, § 292 .02).
Four justices sharply criticized the majority’s analysis, but would have held the
ordinance unconstitutional on other grounds — that it was not limited to “fighting words” as
defined in Chaplinsky and w as substantially overbroad . Id. at 397-98 (W hite, J., concurring
in judgment).
255
Id. at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
256
Id. at 388-89 .
257
Id. at 388.
258
R.A .V., 505 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
259
Id. at 393.
254
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Chaplinsky does not give it a license to regulate “based on hostility . . . towards the
underlying message expressed.”260 In the present case, Scalia argues:
St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression
— it has not, for example, selected for prohibition only those fighting
words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely
obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of
whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance.261
“Selectivity of this sort,” he concludes, “creates the possibility that the city is
seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas.”262 This is precisely what
the doctrine of content discrimination aims to prevent.263
In my view, Justice Scalia’s response is unpersuasive. First, the distinction
between “mode” and “message” cannot be sustained in this context. Fighting words
do not constitute a “mode of speech” in the way that a “noisy sound truck” does.264
Instead, they cause harm through the meaning that they convey. When fighting
words take the form of assaults or threats, the meaning is one of “personal injury
and imminent violence. . . .”265 In other cases, the words express contempt for the
listener, or dare him to fight. In all of these cases, however, fighting words inflict
injury only because of what they express.266 If this were not true, then restrictions
on fighting words, like those on sound trucks, would not be an instance of contentbased regulation at all.
Of course, this is not enough to refute Justice Scalia’s point. One might
concede that fighting words cause injury because of the message they express, but
argue that this injury results solely from an immediate message of violence or
contempt, and not from any broader ideological message the words are meant to
convey. On this view, the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
directed against the latter rather than (or in addition to) the former.267
On one level, this distinction is a valid and important one. There certainly is
a difference between an immediate message of violence or contempt, on one hand,
and a general ideology on the other. It is a fundamental principle of the First
Amendment that government has no power to regulate the expression of ideology
as such, divorced from concrete harm.

260

Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
Id. at 393-94.
262
Id. at 394.
263
Id. at 387.
264
R.A.V. 505 U.S. at 386 (citation and internal quotatio n marks om itted).
265
Id. at 408 (W hite, J., concurring in judgment).
266
See supra Part II.C.2.
267
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (asserting that the ordinance “regulates expression based
on hostility towards its protected ideological content”).
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At least as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, that is not
what the St. Paul ordinance did. Instead, it restricted all displays of race-based
fighting words, whether or not they were intended to express a broader ideology.
As the ordinance’s references to “a burning cross or Nazi swastika” make clear, it
did encompass expressions of ideology.268 But it did so only where those
expressions conveyed a message of immediate violence or contempt, and thus
amounted to fighting words under Chaplinsky.269 In other words, the ordinance
banned the expression of ideas only when it threatened to cause imminent injury.
But is it possible for the expression of ideas to cause injury? In many ways, this
question lies at the heart not only of R.A.V., but also of many other contemporary
disputes over freedom of expression. The question is rarely discussed, however.
In R.A.V., for example, the majority insisted that the regulation was based not on the
injuries caused by hate speech but rather “on hostility towards its protected
ideological content,”270 while the concurring justices took the opposite view. 271
Neither side considered whether speech can cause injury because of the ideas it
expresses. This issue must be confronted, however, if we are to have any hope of
moving beyond sterile and seemingly endless debates over whether particular
regulations are “really” aimed at ideas, or instead are “really” designed to prevent
harm.
In general, the expression of ideas should not be regarded as causing injury.
This is a central tenet of the liberal tradition, and lies at the core of the First
Amendment. On the liberal view, whether based on a Lockean or Kantian theory
of natural rights or a Millian ideal of self-development, rights are rooted in the
human capacity for autonomy or self-determination.272 Human beings have
autonomy because, and insofar as, they are capable of directing their actions
through their own reason. But the use of reason requires free and open
discussion.273 It follows that individuals cannot complain of wrongful injury merely
because they are exposed to ideas they dislike or find offensive. In general, a
reasonable person will consider ideas and respond to them on a rational level.
There are some cases, however, in which speech can cause injury precisely
because of the ideas expressed. Thus (to borrow Ely’s example274 ) a speaker who
shouts “Lynch him!” to an angry crowd gathered in front of a jail expresses an idea
about how the crowd should act. As the courts have long recognized, words of this
sort can constitute “triggers of action.”275 Under Brandenburg v. Ohio,276 such
268

St. Paul Ordinance, supra note 247, § 292.02.
See In re the W elfare o f R.A.V ., 464 N.W .2d 5 07, 5 10 (Minn. 19 91).
270
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
271
Id. at 407, 411 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the St. Paul ordinance
did not involve “the official suppression of ideas,” but rather reflected the city’s judgment
that group-based insults caused greater harms than others).
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See, e.g., M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 4 4, at 10 -14; H eyman, Righting the Balance,
supra note 29, at 1314 (discussing Lockean and Kantian natural rights theory).
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See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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See supra text accompanying note 113.
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speech is unprotected if it is both intended and likely to bring about imminent
violence.277
Opponents of regulation might respond that this is not what they mean when
they assert that the expression of ideas cannot cause injury. Instead, by “ideas” they
mean general ideas or ideological opinions, rather than particular notions such as
that the crowd should lynch this prisoner. The difficulty with this response,
however, is that the general includes the particular. Consider the idea that (accused)
rapists should be lynched. When articulated in general terms, apart from any actual
situation, this idea causes no concrete injury to others. That may no longer be true,
however, when the idea is expressed in a particular context — in front of an angry
crowd outside a jail. There, the general idea about how rapists should be treated is
conjoined with the belief that this individual is a rapist, and this may have both the
purpose and effect of leading the crowd to conclude that this prisoner should be
lynched. In this situation, the expression of the general idea contributes in an
important way to the injuries suffered by the prisoner, and should be held
responsible for those injuries.278
It is now possible to see how the expression of racist ideology through crossburning can cause injury. Cross-burning expresses the belief that minority groups
are inferior and should be subjected to violence or driven out of the community.
This general idea includes the particular idea that these things should be done to the
family in question. When the cross is burned on the family’s lawn, this causes
injury to them, in the same way as any other fighting words (that is, through its
emotional impact or its tendency to provoke responsive violence). Here, the “minor
premise” of the syllogism is supplied by the defendant’s act of identifying this
family as a target and burning the cross in their yard.
Contrary to Scalia’s view, then, fighting words inflict injury not merely because
of their mode of expression, but because of the meaning they convey. And in this
context, no bright-line distinction can be drawn between the immediate message of
the speech and its ideological content.
Up to this point, we have been focusing on Justice Scalia’s contention that the
St. Paul ordinance amounted to unconstitutional content regulation because it
on other grounds, 246 F. 24 (2d C ir. 1917).
276
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
277
Id. at 447.
278
Mill recognizes this point when he writes that, although human beings generally
“should be free to form opinions and to express their opinions without reserve”:
[E]ven opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some
mischievous act. An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated
through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob assembled b efore the house of a corn dealer, or when handed about
among the same mob in the form of a placard.
M ILL, O N L IBERTY , supra note 44, at 53.
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sought to restrict fighting words not as a mode of expression, but because of the
underlying message they conveyed. But Scalia’s argument also contains another
strand, one that focuses on content discrimination. On this view, the problem with
the ordinance is not necessarily that it restricts the messages expressed by fighting
words, but rather that it selectively regulates some messages and not others. For
example, in responding to Justice Stevens’s contention that the St. Paul ordinance
was directed “not to speech of a particular content, but to particular ‘injur[ies]’ that
are ‘qualitatively different’ from other injuries,”279 Scalia writes:
This is wordplay. What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc.,
produced by violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear,
sense of dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is nothing
other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a
distinctive message. The First Amendment cannot be evaded that easily.
It is obvious that the symbols which will arouse “anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender” are those symbols that communicate a message of hostility
based on one of these characteristics.280
By selectively proscribing messages of this sort, Scalia argues, St. Paul violated the
First Amendment ban on content discrimination.281
Although Scalia is correct that the St. Paul ordinance regulated some messages
rather than others, that should not be sufficient to show illegitimate content
discrimination. Instead, the crucial question is what the reason for the
discrimination was. As I have argued, speech that “communicate[s] a message of
hostility” 282 is capable of inflicting injury. But some messages inflict greater injury
than others. A law that imposes a higher level of regulation on speech that inflicts
greater injury should not be struck down under the content discrimination doctrine.
The focus of the inquiry should therefore be on the existence and seriousness of the
injuries caused by different acts of speech. Scalia turns this analysis on its head, by
first observing that any such injuries must flow from the content of the speech, and
then holding that distinctions based on content are “presumptively invalid.”283
When the Mosley doctrine is used in this way, it is hardly possible to formulate, let
alone resolve, the crucial issues in First Amendment cases.
How should we answer the critical question in R.A.V.? Do insults based on
race, gender, and religion cause greater injury than insults in general? There are
several reasons for believing that they do. First, unlike insults that express merely
personal dislike, group-based insults often deny the very humanity of those against

279
280
281
282
283

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392 (quo ting id. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgm ent)).
Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 393-94 .
Id. at 393.
Id. at 382.
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whom they are directed. In this way, they inflict a deeper injury on their targets.284
Second, in an important sense, group-based insults are directed not only against
specific individuals, but also against the group in general. For this reason, they may
inflict injury on a greater number of people, and may tend to provoke violence on
a broader scale. By exacerbating tensions between groups, such insults also tend
to cause greater harm to the community as a whole. And all of these injuries are
heightened when the insults are directed against members of groups that have
historically been subjected to discrimination and oppression.285
The Supreme Court recognized the force of these considerations in Wisconsin
v. Mitchell,286 decided only one year after R.A.V. After Todd Mitchell and some
friends had watched a motion picture that depicted violence against blacks during
the civil rights movement, Mitchell incited the group to severely beat and rob a
young white boy who happened to walk by.287 Upon conviction of aggravated
battery, Mitchell’s sentence was increased under a state hate crimes law that
provided for enhanced sentences when the defendant intentionally selected the
victim because of his “race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, natural
origin or ancestry.”288 Relying on R.A.V., the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck
down the hate crimes law on the ground that it subjected defendants to greater
punishment because of the “ideological content of [their] thought[s].”289 In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, observing that there was reason to believe that “bias-motivated crimes are
more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their
victims, and incite community unrest” than other crimes.290 “The State's desire to
redress these perceived harms,” Rehnquist added, “provides an adequate
explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere
disagreement with offenders’ beliefs or biases.”291 If this is true of laws against hate
crimes, however, it is difficult to understand why it is not equally true of laws
against hate speech, where that speech falls within an unprotected category such as
fighting words. In both instances, the state seeks to impose greater regulation on
bias-motivated acts because they are “thought to inflict greater individual and
societal harm” than other unprotected acts.292

284

See Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, in 1 H ATE
S PEECH AND THE C O N S TIT U TIO N , supra note 244, at xliv [here inafter H eyman, Hate Speech].
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See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 408-09 (W hite, J., concurring in judgment) (contending that
the “overriding message of personal injury and violence” conveyed by fighting words “is at
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Id. at 479-80.
288
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For these reasons, I believe that some forms of hate speech regulation should
be upheld under a rights-based approach to the First Amendment.293 Of course, this
issue is deeply controversial. For present purposes, what is most important is not
how the courts should rule on the question, but how they should approach it. If my
argument is correct, the courts should not seek to dispose of the issue with a
formalistic invocation of the content discrimination doctrine, as the majority did in
R.A.V. Instead, they should directly address the substantive issues in the case:
whether the regulated speech infringes the rights of others, and whether the speech
has sufficient value that it should nevertheless be protected by the First
Amendment.
In addition to these normative and analytical advantages, a substantive approach
to First Amendment cases has important political and rhetorical virtues. As R.A.V.
illustrates, the content discrimination doctrine is capable of generating opinions that
are so inordinately technical that even lawyers have difficulty understanding them.
While such decisions may result in protecting speech in particular cases, they do
nothing to promote public understanding of the broader values underlying the First
Amendment, or of the importance of free speech in our social, political, and
constitutional order. To the extent that the Supreme Court has an educative role in
our system, that role is better served by opinions that openly canvass the substantive
values on both sides, rather than obscuring them in a technical haze. When an
opinion that focuses on substantive values upholds a First Amendment claim, the
opinion is more likely to promote popular acceptance of free speech and tolerance
of dissent. Such an opinion is also more likely to be perceived as legitimate by the
losing side, which can at least feel that its concerns have received serious
consideration. Although a substantive approach may result in upholding more
regulations of speech, it should do so only in cases where a strong argument can be
made that, on balance, our constitutional values are best served by allowing
regulation. In all these ways, a substantive approach seems preferable to one that
strongly focuses on the idea of neutrality.
The contrast between these two approaches clearly emerges when we compare
R.A.V. with the leading Canadian hate speech decision, Regina v. Keegstra.294 In
that case, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to determine whether a federal
law banning the willful promotion of hatred against racial, ethnic, and religious
groups violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Because the law
directly “restrict[ed] the content of expression by singling out particular meanings
that are not to be conveyed,” the court found that the law clearly limited the
freedom of expression guaranteed by Section 2(b) of the Charter.295 That was not
the end of the case, however, for the Charter expressly provided in Section 1 that
all of the rights it set forth were subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law
293

For fuller discussion, see H eyman, Hate Speech, supra note 284.
[1990] 3 S.C .R. 69 7.
295
Id. at 730. Section 2 (b) guarantees the “fundamental freedoms” of “tho ught, be lief,
opinion and exp ression, including freedo m of the press and other media of com munication.”
C A N A D IA N C HAR TER O F R IG H T S A N D F REEDOMS § 2 (citation omitted).
294
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as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”296 To identify
those limits, the court looked to the same “‘values and principles’” that underlay the
Charter rights themselves: “‘respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in
society.’”297
Applying this approach, the court found that the willful promotion of group
hatred caused two kinds of harm that were of the utmost concern in a free and
democratic society. First, such expression inflicted severe psychological and
dignitary injury on members of the target group.298 Second, the expression caused
harm to the society at large by creating “serious discord” between social groups.299
Having identified the harms caused by the regulated speech, the court proceeded to
consider the value of the speech. That value was irrelevant when the question was
whether the speech fell within the outer bounds of Section 2(b), for that section
placed “a high value . . . upon freedom of expression in the abstract.”300 But the
nature and value of the expression could not be ignored when the question was
whether it could legitimately be regulated under Section 1.301
Hate propaganda, the court found, was remote from the core values underlying
the Charter’s guarantee of free expression.302 Although truth “can rarely . . . be
identified with absolute certainty, . . . [t]here is very little chance that statements
intended to promote hatred against an identifiable group are true, or that their vision
of society will lead to a better world.”303 Hate speech might promote the speaker’s
own fulfillment, but only by attacking the “individual self-development and human
flourishing” of other citizens.304 Finally, hate propaganda was inimical to
democratic values because it promoted “a society in which the democratic process
is subverted and individuals are denied respect and dignity simply because of racial
or religious characteristics.”305 In all these ways, hate speech had no more than
marginal value. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that, on the whole, hate speech
regulation tended to promote rather than detract “from values central to freedom of

296

Id. § 1. Provisions of this sort are common in democratic constitutions adopted after
W orld W ar II. See Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Ha te Pro mo tion in a Free and D emocra tic
Soc iety: R. v. Keegstra, 36 M C G ILL L.J. 1416 (199 1).
297
Keeg stra, [1990] 3 S.C .R. at 736 (quoting R. v. O akes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136)
(citation omitted).
298
Id. at 746-47.
299
Id. at 747-48.
300
Id. at 760.
301
Id.
302
Id. at 761-62.
303
Id. at 762-63.
304
Id. at 763.
305
Id. at 764.
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expression.”306 For these reasons, the court rejected Keegstra’s challenge to the
hate-promotion law.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the result in Keegstra, there is much to
be said for the way the Canadian court approaches the problem — by carefully
assessing the substantive values on both sides. The court begins by considering the
harm caused by the speech — a harm defined in terms of the fundamental values
underlying the Charter — and then weighs that harm against the value of the
speech, defined in the same terms. As I have suggested, constitutional values are
better served by this sort of substantive approach than by the highly technical and
formalistic analysis of R.A.V.
B. Pornography: American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut
The traditional justification for regulating obscene materials was that they
tended to undermine public morality, as well as the morals of those who read or
viewed them. In the 1980’s, Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
proposed legislation based on a radically different view — that pornography should
be restricted because it caused harm to women.307 A version of the MacKinnonDworkin ordinance was adopted by the Indianapolis city council in 1984.308 The
ordinance declared pornography to be a form of sex discrimination.309 Pornography
was defined as “the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in
pictures or in words,” that also included other specified elements.310 Civil sanctions
306

Id. at 765.
For a version of the ordinance, see M O DE L A NTI-P O R N O G RA P H Y L AW , in Andrea
Dwork in, Against th e Male F lood : Cen sorship, Po rnography , and Equality, 8 H A R V .
W OMEN ’S L.J. 1, 25-26 (1985).
308
See Am. Bo oksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 , 324 (7th C ir. 198 5), aff’d mem .,
475 U.S. 100 1 (1986 ).
309
Id.
310
Id. at 324 (q uoting Indianap olis Code § 16 -3(q)). Po rnograp hy was defined as:
307

the graphic sexually explicit subordination of wo men, whether in pictures or in
words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Wo men are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual
pleasure in being raped; or
(3) Wo men are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or ph ysically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated
or fragmented or severed into body parts; or
(4) W omen are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) W ome n are p resented in scenarios of degradation, injury
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or
hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for dom ination, conquest,
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were provided against those who violated the ordinance by, for example, producing
or distributing pornography.311 Immediately upon its enactment, the ordinance was
challenged in federal court as a violation of the First Amendment.
As drafted, the ordinance raised serious vagueness and overbreadth concerns.
The ordinance’s definition of pornography was difficult to understand and
potentially quite broad.312 Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court’s definition of
obscenity in Miller v. California,313 the ordinance made no provision for
considering the work as a whole, and made no exception for works with serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.314 The district court relied on these
grounds, among others, to invalidate the ordinance.315 In an opinion by Judge
Easterbrook, however, the court of appeals largely avoided the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, and instead based its decision on far broader grounds.316
Easterbrook did not deny that pornography caused serious harm to women. On
the contrary, he wrote that:
[W]e accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of
subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status
of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and
injury at home, battery and rape on the streets. In the language of the
legislature, “[p]ornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as
a basis of discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of
exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially harms
women. The bigotry and contempt it produces, with the acts of
violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or
positions of servility or sub mission or disp lay.”
Id. (quoting Indianapolis Code § 16-3(q)).
311
Id. at 325-26.
312
See, e.g., Thoma s I. Emerson , Pornography and the First Am end ment: A Rep ly to
Professor MacKinnon, 3 Y ALE L. & P O L’Y R EV . 130, 131-32 (19 85) (arguing that the
ordinance was overbroad).
313
413 U.S. 15 (197 3). In Miller, the Court held that material can be proscribed as
obscene if:
(a) . . . the average p erson , applying contemp orary com munity standards wo uld
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) . . . the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
314
See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
315
Am. Bo oksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 131 6 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
316
See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 7 71 F .2d 3 23 (7th Cir. 198 5), aff’d mem ., 475
U.S. 100 1 (1986 ).
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aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality and rights
[of all kinds].”317
Nevertheless, Easterbrook held the ordinance unconstitutional under the Mosley
principle, concluding that it constituted viewpoint discrimination. “Under the
ordinance,” he wrote:
[G]raphic sexually explicit speech is “pornography” or not depending
on the perspective the author adopts. Speech that “subordinates” women
and also, for example, presents women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or
rape, or even simply presents women in “positions of servility or
submission or display” is forbidden, no matter how great the literary or
political value of the work taken as a whole. Speech that portrays
women in positions of equality is lawful, no matter how graphic the
sexual content. This is thought control. It establishes an “approved”
view of women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, of how the
sexes may relate to each other. Those who espouse the approved view
may use sexual images; those who do not, may not.318
According to Easterbrook, such discrimination was unconstitutional per se.319
Although the courts sometimes “balance[d] the value of speech against the costs of
its restriction,” such balancing was improper where the government had “created
an approved point of view.”320 Instead, Easterbrook asserted, the First Amendment
guaranteed an “absolute right to propagate opinions that the government finds
wrong or even hateful.”321 By a six to three vote, the decision was summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court.322
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Hudnut suffers from the same fundamental flaw
as Justice Scalia’s in R.A.V. The crucial question in such cases is whether the
speech unjustifiably violates the rights of others. If so, then the speech falls outside
of the speaker’s sphere of autonomy, and the bans on content and viewpoint

317

Id. at 329 (quoting Indianapolis Code § 16-1(a)(2)). In a footnote, Easterbrook
qualified this statemen t, observing that the evidence on the effects of pornography was
conflicting and “very difficult to interpret.” Id. at 329 n.2. “In saying that we accept the
finding that po rnography . . . leads to unhap py consequences,” he exp lained, “we me an only
that there is evidence to this effect, that this evidence is consistent with much human
experience, and that as judges w e must accept the legislative resolution of such disputed
empirical questions.” Id. (citation omitted).
318
Id. at 328.
319
Id. at 325, 33 1-32 .
320
Id. at 331-32.
321
Id. at 328.
322
Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 475 U.S. 100 1 (1986 ), aff’g mem . 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor voted to set the case
for argument. Id.
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discrimination should not apply. As in R.A.V., the court’s approach in Hudnut only
obscures this basic issue.323
As Easterbrook concedes, reasonable arguments have been made that the
production, distribution, and display of pornography causes serious injury to
women.324 In particular, it can be argued that, by portraying women as mere sexual
objects to be exploited or abused, pornography is inherently degrading to women,
thereby violating their fundamental right to dignity; that pornography reinforces the
social inequality and subordination of women; and that pornography promotes
violence and discrimination against them. When taken as justifications for
regulating pornography under a rights-based approach to the First Amendment,
these claims raise a host of fascinating and difficult issues. To the extent that these
arguments assert injury to women as a group, they pose a fundamental question
concerning the nature of rights — namely, whether groups can be said to have
rights. Alternatively, one might frame the question as whether there are groupbased wrongs, whether or not there is such a thing as group rights. On the other
hand, to the extent that the feminist arguments assert that pornography results in
injuries to individual women, such as violence and discrimination, there are
important issues of causation. As Easterbrook notes, decisions such as
Brandenburg v. Ohio325 allow regulation of speech only where there is a much
closer relationship between speech and injury than is usually the case with
pornography.326 Yet Brandenburg was concerned with political speech. In cases
involving obscenity or adult expression, the Court has often been willing to allow
regulation on the basis of a much less direct and immediate showing that such
speech causes harm. 327 For this reason, the issue of causation would appear to be
an open question.
323

For persuasive criticism of Hudnut’s approach to pornography regulation, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 D UKE L.J. 589. For a defense of the
viewpoint discrimination approach, see G eoffrey R . Stone , Anti-Pornography Legislation
as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 H ARV . J.L. & P U B . P O L’Y 461 (1986).
324
For some fem inist arguments for pornography regulation, see M AC K IN N O N , supra note
124; Dworkin, supra note 3 07; R ae La ngton, Spe ech Acts a nd U nspeakable Acts, 22 P H IL
& P U B . A FF . 293 (1993); Catharine A. MacK innon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 Y ALE L. & P O L’Y
R EV . 321 (1984); Catharine A. MacK innon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
H ARV . C.R.-C.L. L. R EV . 1 (19 85); Sunstein, supra note 323. Some other feminists opp ose
regulation. See, e.g., N ADINE S TROSSEN , D EF E N D IN G P O R N O G RA P H Y : F REE S PEECH , S EX ,
A N D THE F IGHT FOR W OMEN ’ S R IGHTS (1995); Nan Hunter & Sylvia Law , Brief Amicus
Curiae of Fem inist An ti-Cen sorship Taskforce, 21 U. M ICH . J.L. R E FO R M 69 (198 7-1988);
Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women’s Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 T EX . L.
R EV . 1097 (1 994). For an excellent overview of the deb ate, see F E M IN IS M A N D
P O R N O G RA P H Y (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000).
325
395 U .S. 444, 447 (196 9) (per curiam).
326
See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 333.
327
See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U .S. 41 (19 86); Y oung v. Am . Mini T heatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (197 3).
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For present purposes, there is no need to resolve these issues. Instead, the
critical point is that they should not be evaded by invoking the content neutrality
doctrine. As I have argued, that doctrine should not protect speech that
unjustifiably violates the rights of others. Whether that was true of pornography
was the key question in Hudnut — a question that the court’s opinion only obscured.
Hudnut also strikingly illustrates another problem with an expansive form of the
content neutrality doctrine. From one point of view, the doctrine allows speakers
to engage in self-expression at the expense of others. From another perspective,
however, the doctrine protects the objective content of speech, or the social process
of expression, regardless of its effect on the subjectivity or freedom of anyone. In
Hudnut, Easterbrook makes no claim that pornography, as defined in the
Indianapolis ordinance, is important for the self-realization of those who produce
or view it. Moreover, he concedes that pornography tends to “perpetuate
subordination” and to promote violence and discrimination against women.328
Nevertheless, he asserts that “this simply demonstrates the power of pornography
as speech.”329 “A belief may be pernicious — the beliefs of Nazis led to the death
of millions, those of the Klan to the repression of millions.”330 Moreover, as these
instances show, “pernicious belief[s] may prevail.”331
The process of
communication is not necessarily rational: it often works by promoting
“unconscious responses” that “influence the culture and shape our socialization”
without being “directly answerable by more speech.”332 But these considerations,
Easterbrook asserts, are irrelevant under the First Amendment, which protects
speech despite — or rather because of — the impact that it has on individuals and
the social world.333
In this regard, Easterbrook’s views have much in common with those of Justice
Holmes. In his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States,334 Holmes asserted that
free speech was possible only when individuals overcame their attachment to their
own subjective beliefs, and instead came to trust to the objective workings of the
marketplace of ideas.335 In Abrams, Holmes held out the hope that the market
would lead to the truth, and to the good sought by individuals.336 Yet he tended to
identify truth with the views held by the most powerful groups within the society.337
Like other aspects of social life, the marketplace of ideas was ultimately governed
328

See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329, quoted supra in text accompanying note 317.
Id.
330
Id. at 328.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 330.
333
See id. at 329-30.
334
250 U .S. 616 (1919 ).
335
Id. at 630-31 (Ho lmes, J., dissenting).
336
Id.
337
See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W endell Ho lmes, to Learned Hand (June 24, 19 18), in
Gerald Gun ther, Lea rned Ha nd a nd th e O rigins of Modern First Amendm ent Doctrine:
Some Frag men ts of History, 27 STAN . L. R EV . 719, 757 (1975) (defining “the truth” as “the
majority vote of that nation that can lick all others”).
329
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not by reason but by force. For Holmes, then, nothing in the idea of free speech
precluded the possibility that pernicious beliefs might prevail. As he put it in
Gitlow v. New York,338 “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community,
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way.”339
This dark, almost nihilistic view of the First Amendment — what might be
called free speech noir — may seem far removed from the positive vision expressed
in Mosley, which regards freedom of expression as necessary to promote “selffulfillment for each individual” and “the continued building of our politics and
culture.”340 If these values are taken seriously, however, they would allow the law
to regulate speech that violates the rights of other individuals to pursue their own
self-fulfillment or to participate in the life of the community. As Hudnut suggests,
then, the darker Holmesian view provides one important foundation for a broad
doctrine of content neutrality that protects speech regardless of its impact on others.
IV. REFORMING CONTENT NEUTRALITY
In this Essay, I have argued that the idea of content neutrality plays a deeply
ambivalent role in contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. On one hand,
content neutrality is essential to freedom of speech, while on the other, the courts
have often used the notion in a way that disregards other fundamental rights and
obscures the critical issues in First Amendment cases. This Part discusses how the
theory and doctrine of content neutrality should be reformed in order to preserve its
strengths while avoiding its difficulties.
A. Reforming the Theory
Content neutrality, I have argued, is rooted in a conception of individual and
collective autonomy. According to the Mosley view, this autonomy is invaded
whenever speech is regulated based on its content. While this view contains an
essential truth, it is fatally one-sided, because it focuses only on the positive values
of speech without recognizing the injuries that it can cause. Speech can be used to
threaten personal safety, incite violence, invade privacy, damage reputation, and so
on. In all these instances, the injury flows from the content of expression. Yet
nothing in the Mosley principle allows for regulation in such cases, or in other
instances where speech arguably causes serious injury. While the neutrality
principle is said to rest on the need “[t]o permit the continued building of our
politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,”341 it protects
speech even when it undermines these ends. This outcome can be avoided only by
338
339
340
341

268 U .S. 652 (1925 ).
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U .S. 92, 95-96 (1972 ) (citation omitted).
Id.
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carving out ad hoc exceptions that are difficult to square with the principle stated
in Mosley. The problem with the Mosley doctrine, then, is that it is too formalistic,
protecting speech even when this would undermine the doctrine’s own substantive
purposes.
From another standpoint, however, it may be said that the Mosley approach is
not formalist enough. The doctrine recognizes the autonomy of speakers, but fails
to recognize the autonomy of others who may be affected by the speech. This
autonomy imposes limits on the speaker’s liberty, for as a general rule individuals
have no right to violate the equal freedom of others. Thus, the difficulty with
Mosley is not merely that it protects speech in a way that disregards the speech’s
impact on important substantive values, but also that it fails to recognize the formal
limits that are imposed on all rights by the duty to respect the rights of others.
Under the First Amendment, the government may not restrict content within the
speaker’s own sphere of autonomy. When one person communicates with another,
however, what was initially content for the speaker becomes content for the listener
as well. At this point, the principle of content neutrality can no longer hold absolute
sway. As a general rule, speakers have no right to infringe upon the autonomy of
others. As we have seen, speech can violate autonomy in several ways. One is by
forcing communication on an unwilling listener, thereby violating her own freedom
to decide for herself what expression to hear. Second, speech can violate autonomy
through the effect that its content has on the mind of an unwilling listener. For
example, assaults and threats cause apprehension of violence, thereby violating the
right to personal security, while intentional infliction of emotional distress causes
grave injury to the mind and feelings of the listener. In these cases, speech violates
autonomy by inflicting substantive injury. Speech can also violate the rights of
third parties by inciting violence against them, invading their privacy, or defaming
them.
In short, the Mosley principle ensures broad autonomy for speakers, but only by
effacing other spheres of autonomy. We can put the same point in terms of the
elements of communication. Through expression, the speaker’s own subjective
thoughts and feelings take on outward, objective form as speech, which is then
capable of having an impact on the minds of others. Expression promotes the
speaker’s self-fulfillment and may also promote self-realization for those who
choose to listen to it. Because Mosley fails to recognize the appropriate limits of
free speech, however, it allows the subjectivity of speakers to flourish at the
expense of the subjectivity or selfhood of those affected by the speech. At the same
time, Mosley’s invocation of content neutrality makes this asymmetry difficult to
perceive.
The effect of Mosley can also be viewed in a different way: not as protecting
the subjectivity of speakers at the expense of others, but as protecting objective
content regardless of its impact on the subjectivity and freedom of anyone. As I
have suggested, Justice Holmes’s conception of the marketplace of ideas and Judge
Easterbrook’s views in Hudnut may be understood in this way.342 To take another
342

See sup ra Part III.B.

2002]

SPHERES OF AU TO N OM Y

705

example, news organizations often cover certain stories in a way that is inconsistent
with individual interests in privacy and reputation, as well as with social interests
in the character of public discourse. In some instances, at least, the news
organizations themselves might prefer not to pursue the stories in this way, but feel
compelled to do so to meet competition from rival organizations. Such news
coverage may cause serious harm to the individuals upon which it focuses. And
while many members of the public will watch such coverage if it is available, a
majority of the public (including many of those who would watch) might prefer that
it not be available in order to protect the individual and social interests that would
be damaged by it. In a situation like this, the interests of most people might well be
advanced by rules requiring that news organizations respect limits designed to
protect individual privacy and reputation. As it is usually applied, however, the
content neutrality doctrine would prevent such limits from being imposed by law;343
and in the absence of legal enforcement, these principles will have little power to
restrain intrusive coverage. In such cases, the content neutrality rule has the effect
of protecting content regardless of any destructive effects it might have on
individuals.
In response, it might be said that no limits can be imposed on objective content,
or on the social process of communication, to protect the subjectivity and rights of
individuals, because this presupposes a static conception of the self. The self is not
a fixed, independent entity, but is shaped by society and culture, including the
process of expression.
Although this view has considerable force, it is no less one-sided than the
conception it criticizes. While the self is not fixed, neither is it merely a product or
construction of the society and its culture. Instead, there is a dynamic relationship
between self and society. As our conception of the self develops, this has an
important impact on the society and culture, and vice versa. Although we must be
careful not to cut off possibilities for human change by invoking a static conception
of the self, we also should not leave the self unprotected from destructive forces in
the society and culture. Once again, this calls for a careful effort to reconcile values
on both sides. It is just this process that is ruled out by a rigid adherence to the
principle of content neutrality.
For these reasons, the theory of content neutrality should be reformed so that
it recognizes the autonomy not only of speakers, but also of others affected by the
speech. When speech infringes the rights of other individuals or the community,
it should be subject to regulation unless its value is such as to justify the
infringement. In making such judgments, lawmakers and courts must balance
competing rights. This should be done in an open way that carefully assesses the
considerations involved.
In this way, the idea of content neutrality would be reformed not merely in the
ordinary sense, but in another sense as well. Content neutrality, I have argued, bars
the government from crossing the formal boundary that surrounds individual liberty
and from regulating the content within. On this view, individual autonomy is
343

See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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bounded by other spheres of autonomy. The effect of Mosley, however, has been
to dissolve these other spheres, thereby removing the limits that they impose on free
speech. On the view presented here, the idea of content neutrality should be
re-formed by putting that idea back within a framework that recognizes not only the
autonomy of speakers, but also the formal bounds that are imposed by the duty to
respect the rights of others.
On this view, speech may be regulated only when its value is outweighed by
that of other fundamental rights. Even so, some may fear that this approach would
unduly sacrifice First Amendment values. It may be argued, however, that the
approach would enrich rather than undermine those values. When speech is
required to respect the rights of others, it is directed away from destructive forms
such as fighting words and toward more authentic forms of self-expression and
communication with others.344 Speech of this sort is more consistent with the
constitutional conception of free speech as a right (which may not be used to
wrongfully injure others), as well as with the substantive goods that we use this
freedom to pursue.
B. Reforming the Doctrine
1. When Should Regulations be Regarded as Content-Based?
Finally, let us consider how the doctrine of content neutrality should be
reformed. The first question is when regulations should be regarded as contentbased rather than content-neutral, and therefore in need of the kind of justifications
discussed in this Essay. At first blush, one might expect regulations to be regarded
as content-based when they restrict speech on the basis of content on their face, or
when they are clearly intended to do so. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.,345 however, the majority ruled that laws should be treated as content-based
only when they are “enacted for the purpose of restraining speech” based on its
content.346 Under this approach, even when a regulation expressly classifies and
imposes burdens on speech based on content, the regulation will be treated as
content-neutral if the government can point to some legitimate justification for
adopting it. In Renton, the Court held that an ordinance that restricted the location
of adult movie theaters was not content-based because it was “aimed not at the
content of the films shown at [such theaters,] but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding community,” such as higher crime rates and lower
property values.347 Under the lower standard of review applied to content-neutral
regulations, the ordinance was upheld.348 In recent years, the Court has increasingly
344

See, e.g., Charles R. L awrence III, If He Ho llers Let H im Go: Regu lating Ra cist
Speech on Campus, 1990 D UKE L.J. 431, 452-53 (19 90).
345
475 U.S. 41 (1 986 ).
346
Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added).
347
Id. at 47.
348
Id. at 50-55.
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resorted to this “secondary effects” doctrine, although it has done so most often in
cases involving sexually explicit expression, which the Court has often relegated
to a lesser status under First Amendment.349 On the other hand, the Court has
refused to apply Renton to laws that seek to protect listeners from the emotional
impact of speech, holding that this is a direct and not a secondary effect.350
Underlying Renton is the valid insight that laws may be justified even when
they regulate speech based on content. But this insight relates to the justification
for a regulation, not to the threshold question of whether a justification is required
because the law is content-based.351 Under the approach taken here, a regulation
should be regarded as content-based if its application turns on content in any of the
four senses that I have discussed: (1) the meaning of the speech for the speaker; (2)
its objective meaning; (3) its impact on the listener; or (4) the communication of
meaning from speaker to listener. Regulations based on content in any of these
senses restrict the First Amendment liberties of speakers and/or listeners.
Regulations of this sort are not necessarily unconstitutional, but they can be
justified only to protect the rights of others.352 Laws should be regarded as contentneutral only if they are limited to the time, place, and manner of expression, without
regard to content, or if, as in United States v. O’Brien,353 they are aimed at the
noncommunicative impact of conduct and have only an incidental effect on
expression.
Such an approach would promote constitutional values better than the approach
taken in Renton. On one hand, the standard of review should not vary depending
on whether the Court sympathizes with the regulation at issue. On the other hand,
an important reason why decisions like Renton seek to avoid content-based analysis
is that the analysis is so demanding as to almost invariably strike down the
regulation under review. No such evasion would be necessary if the Court adopted
the approach of this Essay, and recognized that some content-based regulations are
entirely legitimate.
2. How Should Courts Review Content-Based Regulations?
Although Mosley declared that content-based regulation “is never permitted,”354
later decisions recognized two major exceptions to this rule.355 First, the law could
349

For the most recent example, see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312 , 321 (1988); id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
351
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 56-57 (B rennan, J., dissenting). For persuasive criticism of
Renton, see W illiams, supra note 17, at 628-35.
352
This is true in all cases where free speech is a fundamental right. As I have suggested
elsewhere, however, there may be some sorts of speech (such as commercial advertising) that
should be regarded as non-fundamental rights. Sp eech of this sort should be sub ject to
regulation not on ly to pro tect othe r rights, but also to p romote the public goo d. See Heyman,
Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1317 n.227.
353
391 U .S. 367 (1968 ).
354
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99.
355
See supra Part II.A.
350
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restrict expression that fell within an unprotected or less protected category, such
as fighting words, incitement, or obscenity.356 Second, even fully protected speech
was subject to content-based regulation if necessary to promote a compelling
government interest.357
As we have seen, however, these exceptions have done little to mitigate the
rigidity of the Mosley doctrine. The Court has been quite reluctant to recognize
new categories of unprotected speech. Indeed, it has done so only once, by holding
in New York v. Ferber358 that child pornography was outside the protection of the
First Amendment. In two other contexts, commercial speech and “adult”
expression, the Court has accorded a category some protection, but less than that
enjoyed by fully protected speech.359
To be sure, courts should be extremely careful not to unduly expand the
categories of regulable expression. New categories should be recognized only when
they are clearly justified. But there is no warrant for assuming that the categories
recognized in previous cases are the only valid ones. As one would expect from a
process of case-by-case adjudication, the categories of unprotected speech have
been determined in piecemeal fashion, and have never been worked out in a logical
or systematic way.360 It follows that the Court should not decline to recognize a
category simply because it has not previously been recognized. The problem with
such an approach is strikingly illustrated by the Court’s treatment of privacy — a
right which has as much claim to protection as the right to reputation, but which has
received little protection, in part because of the Court’s hesitance to recognize new
categories of regulable expression.361
The second exception to the Mosley doctrine also has done little to afford
protection to other rights. Although the Court has stated that it would uphold
content-based regulations that are able to withstand strict scrutiny, it has very rarely
done so.362 This is hardly surprising, for strict scrutiny is designed to sharply limit
governmental power in the areas to which it applies.
Even if strict scrutiny were not applied in a way that made it “‘strict’ in theory
[but] fatal in fact,”363 there are at least two reasons why it would be difficult to use
356

See sup ra note 1 29 and ac com panying text.
See sup ra note 1 37 and ac com panying text.
358
458 U .S. 747 (1982 ).
359
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson G as & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com m’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(commercial speech); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (adult
expression); Young v. Am. M ini Theatres, Inc., 427 U .S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(same).
360
In Chaplinsky, for example, the Court mentioned “the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” as categories of unprotected speech,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), yet failed to mention such obvious
categories as threats and incitement.
361
See supra text accompanying notes 219-28.
362
See supra Part II.A.
363
Gerald Gun ther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H ARV . L. R EV . 1, 8 (1972).
357
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the doctrine to protect other rights from being infringed by speech. First, strict
scrutiny allows regulation only to achieve an extraordinary or “compelling”
government interest. Second, the regulation must shown to be “necessary” in a
strong sense — that is, it must be the least restrictive means of promoting the
government interest. These two facets of the doctrine are meant to erect a very high
barrier against regulation. That may be entirely appropriate when First Amendment
problems are viewed as the strict-scrutiny doctrine views them — as conflicts
between the right to free speech and “government interests.” When the issue is
framed in this way, we may well be inclined to protect freedom as much as possible.
As I have shown, however, many free speech problems are better understood as
conflicts between free speech and other fundamental rights. In such cases, it is not
appropriate to begin with a very strong presumption in favor of protecting speech.364
Instead, the court should carefully consider the value of the rights on both sides.
Rather than applying strict scrutiny, or merely inquiring whether the speech at
issue falls into a traditionally unprotected category, courts should first ask whether
the speech infringes fundamental rights belonging to other individuals or the
community. If so, the court should determine whether the value of the speech
outweighs the injury that it causes. If it does, then the speech should be held
privileged under the First Amendment; if not, the speech unjustifiably invades the
rights of others and should not be protected by the rule against content regulation.365
Finally, the court should consider whether the regulation violates the rule against
content discrimination by treating the regulated speech less favorably than other
speech that has the same value and causes the same sort of injury.
3. Should the Doctrine Apply to Unprotected Speech? R.A.V. Revisited
364

In his concurrence in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), Justice Breyer
expresses a similar view: “W hat this Court has called ‘strict scrutiny’ — with its strong
presumption against constitutionality — is normally out of place where, as here, important
competing constitutional interests are im plicated.” Id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring). In
Bartnicki, the “comp eting constitutional interests” that Breyer has in mind include the
interests in privacy and in private spee ch. Id. Strictly speaking, however, the Constitution
protects these interests against interference only by the government, not by private parties.
Thus, it app ears that in this passage Breyer uses “constitutional interests” in a broad sense,
to refer to fundamental rights of the sort that are protected against government interference
by the Constitution, and ag ainst private interference by state and federal law. For a defense
of the view that free speech may be regulated to protect other fundamental rights, whether
those rights are protected by the Constitution or by other source s of law, see Heyman,
Righting the Balance, supra note 29, at 1366-68.
365
Insofar as possible, such determinations should be made on a categorical rather than
an ad hoc level. In addition to be ing mo re principled , a categorical approach offers the
greatest protection against the impulse to suppress expression merely because it is unpopular,
or beca use of heightened fears in times o f crisis. See, e.g., Ely, Flag Desecration, supra
note 106, at 1500-01. As Professor Shiffrin has shown, however, there are situations in
which constitutional values are best protected through more particularized decisionmaking.
See S H IFF RIN , R OMANCE , supra note 1 7, at 15 -17.
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As we have seen, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,366 the Supreme Court reviewed
an ordinance that banned cross burning and other forms of hate speech based on
race, religion, and gender. As authoritatively construed by the state courts, the
ordinance applied only to speech that amounted to unprotected “fighting words”
under Chaplinsky.367 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia held that the ordinance
improperly discriminated on the basis of content, because instead of banning all
fighting words, it singled out those based on race, religion, and gender.368
The majority was able to reach this result only by means of a dramatic
expansion of the content discrimination doctrine. In earlier cases, the doctrine had
been applied only to discrimination between different forms of constitutionally
protected expression (such as the labor and non-labor picketing at issue in
Mosley).369 In R.A.V., the Court for the first time held that the doctrine also barred
the state from drawing distinctions within unprotected categories of speech such as
fighting words.370 Sharply criticizing this innovation, Justice White argued that the
majority’s holding undermined the traditional “categorical approach” to the First
Amendment, under which certain narrowly defined classes of speech were
unprotected and could be “regulated freely on the basis of content.”371
In a previous section, we explored R.A.V.’s treatment of the problem of hate
speech.372 Here I want to focus on Justice Scalia’s revision of the content
discrimination doctrine. Was it appropriate for the Court to expand the rule in the
way that it did? In my view, the doctrine does have some application to unprotected
expression, but it should be applied in a more flexible way than with regard to
protected speech.
At the outset of his opinion, Scalia acknowledges that the Court has repeatedly
described certain categories of speech as outside the protection of the First
Amendment. But these statements, he contends, “must be taken in context” and are
not “literally true.”373 Instead:
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the
First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally
proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are
categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content.374
366

505 U .S. 377 (1992 ).
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 ; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380-81 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing state court decision).
368
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 .
369
See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
370
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 400.
371
Id. at 399-403 (W hite, J., concurring in judgment).
372
See supra Part III.A.
373
R.A .V., 505 U.S. at 383 (citation omitted).
374
Id. at 383-84.
367
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If the government were allowed to draw distinctions within an unprotected category
of expression, Scalia argues, it might use this power to suppress ideas or viewpoints
of which it disapproves.375 For this reason, such distinctions, like other forms of
content discrimination, should be treated as “presumptively invalid,” and upheld
only when necessary to serve compelling state interests.376
In this way, R.A.V. transposes the Mosley doctrine to the realm of unprotected
speech. At the same time, Scalia concedes that the doctrine “applies differently in
[this] context . . . than in the area of fully protected speech.”377 In particular, the
rule should not apply “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,” for in
this situation “no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”378
Scalia offers several illustrations of what he means:
[1] A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the
most patently offensive in its prurience—i.e., that which involves the
most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for
example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political
messages. . . . [2] And the Federal Government can criminalize only
those threats of violence that are directed against the President . . . since
the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment .
. . have special force when applied to the person of the President. . . .
But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats
against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities. [3]
And . . . a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry
but not in others, because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of
commercial speech that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment
protection . . .) is in its view greater there. . . . But a State may not
prohibit only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a
demeaning fashion.379
In each of these examples, the criterion that the legislature has used to define
the subcategory of prohibited speech (offensive political messages, mention of the
375

Id. at 387, 390.
Id. at 382; see id. at 395-96 (applying strict scrutiny).
377
Id. at 387 (citatio n omitted).
378
Id. at 388. Scalia also lists several other instances in which the doctrine should not
apply because there is “no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination,” id.: (1)
regulations that are aimed not at co ntent but at the “secondary effects of speech,” id. at 389
(internal quotation marks omitted), as defined in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1 986 ), discussed in supra Part IV.B.1; (2) regulations of conduct that impose
incidental restriction s on sym bolic speech, see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90; and (3) any other
situation in which “the nature of the co ntent discrimina tion is such that there is no re alistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot,” id. at 390.
379
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388-89 (citations omitted).
376
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President’s urban policy, demeaning portrayals of men) has no connection at all
with the reason why the entire category of speech (obscenity, threats, commercial
speech) is denied full protection under the First Amendment. Instead, in these
illustrations the legislature obviously has used those categories as “vehicles for
content discrimination”380 entirely unrelated to the reason why the speech is
proscribable. In such cases, it may be appropriate to subject the regulations to the
same standard of review that would apply to any other form of content
discrimination.
In most cases, however, the issue is not so clear-cut, for there is a plausible
connection between the legislative criterion and the reason why the entire category
of speech is unprotected. In R.A.V., for example, the St. Paul City Council may
have believed that insults based on race, religion, or gender were more deeply
degrading than other insults, and therefore more likely to inflict injury or provoke
violence. If so, then the ordinance would fall within Scalia’s exception for content
discrimination that is based on “the very reason [why] the entire class of speech
[fighting words] is proscribable.”381
In short, even under Scalia’s approach, a legislature may be justified in
drawing a distinction within an unprotected category of speech if there is a
sufficient relationship between the legislative classification and the reason why the
entire category is unprotected. The critical issues then become: (a) how close this
relationship must be; and (b) who should decide whether such a relationship exists.
Here a comparison with the Court’s approach to protected speech may be
illuminating. There, too, a content-based classification will be upheld if it is
sufficiently related to a constitutionally acceptable reason for regulation. In the area
of protected speech, this relationship must be a very close one: under the strict
scrutiny doctrine, the regulation must be “necessary to serve a compelling
[government] interest,” and must be “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”382 In
applying this standard, the Court grants little deference to the legislature, but
instead undertakes to determine for itself whether such a relationship has been
shown to exist.
These features of strict scrutiny reflect the basic premises of the Court’s
content neutrality jurisprudence. That jurisprudence is based on the view that there
are few legitimate reasons for regulating the content of speech that is protected by
the First Amendment.383 For this reason, the Court holds that there is a strong
presumption against the validity of content-based regulation — a presumption that

380

Id. at 383-84 .
Id. at 388.
382
Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991) (emp hasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
383
See, e.g., Boo s v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 337 (1988) (B rennan, J., concurring in part and
in judgment) (referring to “the unlikelihood of any legitimate governmental interest in a
content-based restriction o n speech (especially political speec h)”).
381
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can be overcome only by a convincing demonstration that a particular regulation is
necessary to meet a compelling interest.384
This discussion points to a fundamental distinction between the realms of
protected and unprotected speech — a distinction that has crucial implications for
how the Mosley rule should apply to each. In the area of protected speech, content
regulation is presumptively unconstitutional. In the area of unprotected speech, this
presumption is reversed. Instead, the general rule is that the state does have
authority to regulate an unprotected category of speech, such as fighting words, to
prevent the harms that it causes. In determining whether and how such speech
should be regulated, the legislature must consider a wide range of factors: the
seriousness of the harms caused by the speech; the likely effectiveness of
regulation; the costs of enforcement; the impact of regulation on free speech and
other values; and so on. In light of these considerations, the legislature might
choose to regulate some kinds of speech within the unprotected category, but not
others; or to impose greater regulation on some kinds than others. To be sure, the
classifications that the legislature adopts must be subject to judicial review under
the First Amendment. The key question, however, is what form this review should
take. Because regulation of speech within an unprotected category is presumptively
constitutional, it should not be subject to the very stringent review applied to
restrictions on protected speech. Instead, the legislature should be afforded a
greater degree of leeway. In particular, rather than requiring a very close
connection between the legislative classification and the allowable reason for
regulation, a substantial relationship should suffice. And because decisions as to
whether and how to regulate (and the factors on which these decisions are based)
call for essentially legislative judgments, courts should defer to reasonable
determinations by the legislature, rather than imposing their own views.
Under this approach, a ban on group-based fighting words should be upheld.
As Justice Stevens observed, it was entirely “reasonable and realistic” for the St.
Paul City Council to “determine that threats based on the target’s race, religion, or
gender cause more severe harm to both the target and the society than other
threats.”385 The majority disregarded this legislative judgment and unhesitatingly
substituted its own, asserting that the ordinance “assuredly does not fall within the
exception for content discrimination based on the very reasons why the particular
384

In this Essay, I have argued that the Court has taken too narrow a view of the reasons
for regulating speech, and have criticized the use of strict scrutiny in cases that involve
conflicts between sp eech and other fundam ental rights. See sup ra Part IV.B.2. The argum ent
of the present section is that, whatever the merits of the Co urt’s approach in general, it should
not be uncritically extended to the realm of unpro tected speech.
385
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 425
(same); id. at 407 (W hite, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that, “[i]n light of our
Nation’s long and painful exp erience with discrimina tion,” it was “plainly reasonable” for
St. Paul to make a “judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender are
more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting words”) (citations
omitted); supra text accompanying notes 284-92 (discussing the deeper injuries caused by
group-based insults).
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class of speech . . . is proscribable.”386 The majority then invoked strict scrutiny to
invalidate the ordinance.387 In this way, the Court unwisely held regulations of
unprotected speech to the same demanding standards that govern expression that is
fully protected by the First Amendment.388
4. State Support for Expression
This Essay has focused on how the content neutrality principle should apply to
laws that restrict speech. But the issue of neutrality also arises when the
government takes a more affirmative approach to expression. When the government
itself speaks, either directly or through private surrogates, there is general
agreement that the content neutrality doctrine does not apply, and that the
government may determine the content of its own speech.389 The problem is much
more complex, however, when the government provides funding for private
expression. In struggling with this issue, the Supreme Court has oscillated between
two diametrically opposed views. Some opinions apply the neutrality doctrine to
funding decisions in much the same way that it applies to traditional restrictions on
speech.390 Other cases reject this view and maintain that the First Amendment
imposes few if any constraints on funding decisions.391
As I have argued elsewhere, both views are unsatisfactory.392 Under the First
Amendment, the government cannot have arbitrary power to determine what speech
to support. But the problem cannot adequately be understood on the model of
traditional censorship. In relation to individual autonomy of thought and
expression, government represents an external force. The government may restrict
this autonomy only when necessary to protect the autonomy of others. But the
386

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted). The majority rested this conclusion on the
unpersuasive and hypertechnica l grounds disc ussed earlier, supra text accompanying notes
259-66, that the injuries caused by fighting words derive only from the way in which they are
expressed, not the messages they convey, and that there is therefore no reason to believe that
fighting words based on race, religion, or gender cause any greater injury than others. See
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 -94.
387
Id. at 395 -96.
388
For other criticisms o f this doctrinal expansion, see S T E VE N H. S H IFF RIN , D IS S EN T ,
I NJUSTICE , AND THE M EANINGS OF A MERICA 49-8 7 (1999 ); Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 5963 (contending that “Justice Scalia’s approach in R.A.V. adds enormous confusion to the law
concerning the principle of content neutrality”).
389
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U .S. 819, 833-34 (19 95).
390
See, e.g., id. The mo st forceful statements of this position may be found in NEA v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 600 (1998) (Sou ter, J., dissenting), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
203 (19 91) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
391
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation W ith
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). The most uncompromising statement of this view
appears in Finley, 524 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
392
Steven J. Heym an, State-Supported Speech, 1999 W IS . L. R EV . 111 9 [hereinafter
Heyman, State-Supported Speech].
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situation is quite different in the funding context. In this setting, the relationship
between government and expression is more internal. When the government
establishes a program to support expression, it does so to promote some public
good. If the program is to be effective, the government must be able to determine
what forms of expression will best promote this good. For example, if a state
creates a program to support the arts, it will provide funding for artistic expression,
but not for scientific inquiry. Moreover, the state may decide to award grants based
on artistic excellence, or to give preference to works that relate to the history and
culture of that state. Of course, such distinctions are based on content, and would
be impermissible if used to regulate private expression. Under the First
Amendment, the state may not punish people who choose to pursue careers in
science rather than art, or who produce art that falls short of excellence, or that does
not relate to the history or culture of the state. Yet distinctions of this sort may be
perfectly legitimate in the context of funding programs, whose aim is not to restrict
liberty, but rather to provide benefits both for individuals and for the community at
large. In the context of private expression, the ideal of autonomy means that
individuals generally should be free to make their own decisions. By contrast, in
the funding context autonomy is not merely individual, but also communal: While
individuals should have a right to seek to participate in public programs, the
community also should have a right to shape such programs in a way that will best
promote the public good.
These considerations lead to a centrist position on state-supported speech. On
one hand, the state should have substantial authority to determine the contours of
funding programs. On the other hand, the state must be prevented from using this
power to penalize private expression. Moreover, the benefits of public programs
should be distributed in a way that is fair in light of the purposes they are intended
to serve. To meet these concerns, laws that impose restrictions on funding should
be reviewed as follows. First, as a threshold matter, the court should ask whether
the law denies support to applicants because of their speech outside the context of
the public program. If so, the law should be treated in the same way as a traditional
regulation of expression. Absent adequate justification, such a law should be struck
down as an “unconstitutional condition” or penalty on protected speech.393
When a law restricts funding for expression only within the context of the
program itself, the problem should not be viewed as one of unconstitutional

393

“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ho lds that go vernm ent may not grant a
benefit on the cond ition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government m ay w ith ho ld th at b enefit a ltoge ther.” Ka thle en M . Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 H ARV . L. R EV . 1413, 1419 (1989).
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conditions.394 Instead, such laws should receive a form of intermediate scrutiny.395
Under this approach, criteria for funding should be upheld if several requirements
are met. First, the criteria must be substantially related to the purposes of the
program. Second, those purposes must be constitutionally legitimate. Third, the
criteria must treat the program’s beneficiaries (and others) in a way that accords
with constitutional norms of respect for individual liberty and equality. Finally, the
program must not have the purpose or effect of undermining other aspects of the
constitutional order. Under this analysis, a state arts program could award funds on
the basis of artistic excellence. But it could not provide funding only for
Democratic artists, for this would not be substantially related to any legitimate
purpose served by the program. Nor could funding be conditioned on an artist’s
agreement to submit her completed work to government officials and to make
whatever changes they demanded, for this would be inconsistent with the autonomy
of thought and expression protected by the First Amendment.
In short, funding decisions should not be free from First Amendment
constraints. Those constraints do not apply in the same way in all contexts,
however. Under the First Amendment, the state’s authority to restrict expression
on the basis of content is fairly limited. By contrast, when the state establishes a
program to affirmatively support expression, it may take content into account to the
extent necessary to promote the public purposes of the program, so long as other
constitutional principles are respected.
V. CONCLUSION
When confronted with difficult First Amendment problems, courts have
increasingly resorted to the content neutrality doctrine. That is understandable, for
the doctrine appears to offer judges a way to escape from grappling with such
ideologically charged issues as hate speech and pornography. But this escape is an
illusion. Controversies over free speech arise from real conflicts of values —
conflicts that cannot be resolved by a formalistic appeal to neutrality.
This Essay has urged the adoption of a more substantive approach — an
approach that seeks to identify the competing values and to reconcile them within
a broader normative framework. The key to this framework lies in the ideal of
autonomy. The First Amendment reflects a conception of the autonomy of
individuals and the community to determine the content of their own expression.
That is the foundation of the content neutrality principle. In some instances,
however, speech goes beyond the bounds of the speaker’s autonomy and violates
the rights of others — rights such as personal security, privacy, reputation, and
394

See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (observing that the Court’s “‘unconstitutional conditions’
cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of
the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the
recipient from engaging in the p rotected co nduc t outside the scope of the [Governmentfunded] program”).
395
See Heyman, State-Supported Speech, supra note 392, at 1154-58.
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equality, which are grounded in the same values as free speech itself. When the
state regulates such expression, it should not be regarded as violating the First
Amendment, but rather as fulfilling its responsibility to protect the rights of its
citizens. It is by safeguarding those rights, including freedom of speech, that we can
best realize the vision articulated in Mosley — to promote “the continued building
of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual.”396
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Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.

